Episode Transcript
Speaker 0 00:00:00 Hello, everyone who has joined us. My name is Jennifer Anju Grossman. I go by JAG and, uh, we are here with a clubhouse with our senior scholar, Jason Hill. He is, uh, a professor of philosophy at DePaul university author of several books, um, including what do white Americans owe black people. Um, and, uh, he's gonna talk to us today about America in the age of nihilism. So, um, also wanted to recognize Scott Schiff, my colleague from the outlet society in the room, as well as our founder, David Kelly. Um, and I would love to ask all of you who are in the room for a favor, please go ahead and share this conversation on clubhouse, on Twitter, on Facebook. And, uh, this is gonna be quite the treat. So Jason, hand it over to you gotta unmute
Speaker 1 00:01:09 This, this particular talk is going to be a little bit technical. Unlike the sec, I'm gonna make it a two part talk. Um, I'm a train philosopher and I'm very systematic. So, um, rather than sort of just like give this really broad sweeping talk about nihilism, which I have written about. Um, I, I, I wanted to go back to the, to the beginnings of the foundations for what would give us a reason for talking about nihilism in the first place, rather than just making sweeping generalizations. That might be true. So I decided to start with the epistemology. Um, and I, I, I realized going back through my notes, um, in my philosophy of science class that I've been teaching for at DePaul for nine years now and teaching popper and coin and all those folks, um, that it was through epistemology, that I would be able to come to an understanding if there really is something called epistemological nihilism, which would then give me license to talk about moral nihilism, which is what I'm gonna talk about next time I won clubhouse. So, um, epistemological, I realize what a nonsensical claim epistemological nihilism really is. It's, it's on the same order as you know, prove to me that I exist or prove to me that I'm conscious or prove to me that existence exists. Um, it's the belief of course, that, uh, it's a, it's a form of philosophical skepticism, which claims that knowledge does not exist, or if it does exist, it's unattainable for human beings. Now it shouldn't be confused with what I'm gonna talk about today with epistemological fallible, which claims that all knowledge is.
Speaker 1 00:03:01 But what I want to do is by showing that epistemological FISM is unfounded. Therefore epistemological nihilism is a bunch of nonsense, but I take epistemological FISM and I take proper quite seriously. So what I wanna show is that, um, I think epistemological nihilism is logical is logically parasitic on, but not necessarily dependent on fallible. Um, so let me just get right into part of what I want to say. Um, so Popp is an interesting guy, pop Carl popper he's was revered as the, the preeminent philosopher of science and the mid 20th century early, um, 19 20th, thirties. Um, and I take his mind best to end this mine respected a lot, but nevertheless, a misguided one in terms of, um, his claims of, uh, refuting inductive inferences as the basis for scientific inquiry or as the basis for acquiring any kind of real knowledge about the world.
Speaker 1 00:04:26 So what I wanna show is that Popper's inductive inferences lead him right back to a journey through, through, through his falsification and through his method of cooperation. It leads him right back to, um, inductive inferences. So for Popp inducted inferences, you know, any pattern of argument we regard as reasonable, but which does not claim deductive validity. Um, so with the problem of induction, we want to know if anything makes sense, if it makes sense to extrapolate from a limited sample to a broader generalization. I think David talked about this Y when he gave his talk, um, if we may try to answer by pointing to scientific knowledge or to successful previous inductive inferences, as far as Hume, and as far as popper RDA was concerned, we're offering just more instances of extrapolations that were trying to justify. So the question is, you know, what makes, uh, extrapolation reasonable?
Speaker 1 00:05:32 So Popp, um, is really something of a, an outlier in the debate over induction. He, he takes hum to under, to, to, to, to have to believe that induction is a bad influential strategy and proper things that a rational person is one who would refuse to, to use inductive references, refuse to extrapolate from past the future, uh, from a finite number of observations to a more general theory, um, about a state of affairs. So PA's, um, conviction is that theories can never be inferred, uh, from OB observation statements or rationally justified by them. So for him, um, the business of science is not to prove anything. Science is not prove anything. Science can only falsify theorists. Uh, so we need to do science without appeal, to inducted reasoning, proper claims, and we can never, or we can never conclude reasonably that scientific generalizations are true, but we conclude that some are false.
Speaker 1 00:06:45 So he says that science must proceed by a process of conjecture and, um, uh, and that the scientist begins by formulating a general claim about the nature of the world, and then seeks to refute it by gathering data regarding fossils DNA, et cetera, which if they're going the wrong way, they have the potential to show decisively that or general claims about, about ancestry DNA, um, whatever we take to be the, the, the, the material as false. What makes something a general piece, genuine piece of science for popper is its potential, uh, vulnerability to reputation that's falsifiable. That seems right. Right. So I have no quarrel so far. So a properly scientific theory for popper is going to stick its neck out regarding the sorts of events that it does not permit. So regarding the sorts of pieces of evidence that would lead the theory to be abandoned.
Speaker 1 00:07:50 Um, and this was his claim. This was his Quora with Marxism, right? He, he offers this notion what he called a line of demarcation, which is going to distinguish between pseudosciences like Marxism and psycho psychoanalysis and real sciences like chemistry and physics because, uh, astrology and which I think he takes psychoanalysis to be a form of astrology in his mean, or moment, but something like psychoanalysis is, does not make itself amenable to reputation nor falsification, because the claims are so generalizable. It's like astrology, you know, don't go out. Um, the Venus is in Saturns, uh, Mars today and life holds for you. Great things. Well, that can be applied to almost anyone. Um, popper says, so scientific theorists must put themselves up for test and they must stick their necks out and run the gauntlet of experiment through corroboration. Uh, he says that DMAR observation is theory Laden, and that neutral statements about observation data are shot through with assumptions about scientific theory.
Speaker 1 00:09:04 So even if we never conclude reasonably that a theory is likely to be true, we can conclude that some theories are absolutely false. Now he has this notion of, uh, what's, some are called piles in a swamp, which I just want to. Um, so the question is, well, how do we, how do we ever get off the ground? How do we ever make some sort of, uh, claim a epi theological claim about a theory about experiments? Uh, if we're going to, um, reject completely influential inductive inferences, where deduction, he, he, he actually admits that deductive, um, arguments are deductive reasoning yields vertical. That's interesting because we start from a set of knowledge plans that are particularly well known, and the conclusions are almost to any sense of the mind are Al already known before you even start the reasoning process. You can just sort of like in a quick rapid form of ation, know what the truth is.
Speaker 1 00:10:10 Um, so when observation and theory clash, how do we think scientists are supposed to decide whether to discard the theory on the grounds that the, um, that the observation intention, which it, which with it are to be trusted. So I'm gonna read from the logic of scientific, um, um, discussion here, um, and Popp says science is not rest upon solid bedrock. Um, the bolt structure of its theor rises as if it were above a swamp. It is like a building erected on piles. The piles are driven down from above into the swamp, but not down to any natural given base. And if we stop driving the piles deeper, it is not because we have reached firm ground. We simply stop when we are satisfied that the piles are firm enough to carry the structure, at least for the time being.
Speaker 1 00:11:11 So this idea that science is not rest upon solid, be rock is going to be comforting to people who, um, who stressed out the fallibility of their work. But here's the problem though, where I have the Koal with Popp Popp thinks that we can use a certain class of observation statements, namely what he calls the things that we decide to accept as the basis for falsification theories. And listen to this. He says, these are statements that the scientific community views as UN controversial and Papa calls them in quotes, basic statements, basic statements. All right. So where am I? The timing? Oh, I'm 15 minutes. Okay. So, um, I'm trying to make this as non-technical as possible. It isn't clear to me that what poppers calling basic statements themselves aren't statements that are derived from inductive inferences. In fact, they have to be, because one simply does not refer to deductive conclusions from, from premises as basic premises or collective assumptions.
Speaker 1 00:12:27 So that's not how we treat deductive arguments. So Papa here seems to appeal to the fall of what I would call authority, right. A good epistemological rapist will ignore this basic statement stuff as non-no that is proposition statement that simply lead proper back via kind of circuitous form of circular reasoning back to in, in inductive inferences, without the inferences of ordinary folks reasoning, but one stamped, I think within IM premature of a sort of elite set of Giled scientists. Um, so the basic statements that we are going to rely on when there's a tension between observation and, um, um, and proof is, is the basic statements of clearheaded science and what he calls convention. So I'm gonna label Papa here as, uh, an epistemological, a scientific epistemological collectivist in this sense. Um, and I'm going to argue that those basic statements, well, I am arguing that those basic statements in no way, um, have deductive validity to them that they are the sum total and the compilation, um, of inferential, um, inductive infer in inference inferences that have been codified into basic assumptions, collectivized assumptions among scientists that form something like receive wisdom or convention.
Speaker 1 00:14:06 Um, okay. So, um, so if the, if the epistemological, uh, if the epistemological, if I'm modified or soft core epistemological, um, fall rejects, deductive knowledge as trivial, because it simply parses together in a formal style that which, um, is self evident. And I think our knowledge of the world and our concepts that we form come from induction, right? The process of observing the facts of reality. And as Rand said, integrating them into. So going back to Papa's basic statements, we can say, I think, and I'm open to, uh, persuasion here that all deductive premises, that form the basis of a deductive argument are themselves antied traceable back to inductive inferences, right? So we can take any deductive arguments. Socrates is a man, all men are mortal. SOCs is mortal take any one of those premises. It's not evidently clear that Socrates is a man isn't to have gotten to that state.
Speaker 1 00:15:26 If you, I mean, we re Plato that that's not dependent on a set of inductive inferences to have got to that conclusion. So Okta is a man that all men are mortal is no more, um, an inductive inference than his Hume statement that he's not sure the son is going to rise tomorrow. That the only reason, I mean, he obviously, uh, dispenses with the law of identity, but Hume is not sure the sun is going to rise tomorrow because on a reason he thinks that we are sure the sun is going to rise tomorrow is through experience and convention. And that's the way it's always been. But logically doesn't think there's any reason that the lost sun has to rise tomorrow. Right. Um, and Socrates is mortal. Um, what one could one could apply the influential argument here and say, that's, that's that deduct that deductive conclusion is also derived from an inferential, um, form of reasoning.
Speaker 1 00:16:29 So Papa, I don't think Papa can have it both way. The question is, is best framed by way of an analogy just as, just as parent, as a concept is logically prior or antis pedent to the concept orphan or something is logically prior antis pedent to the concept. Nothing. I think deduction is antis pedent is dependent and logically posterial to the induction inference. So the stuff out of which deductive inferences are made are themselves logical opposi to inductive arguments and the propositional statements that form the conceptual base of all inductive inferences, which then are on a sale, but true premises of the deductive arguments come from in, in some form of prior, in, in, in inducted inferential reasoning. But there can be no deductive inferences or claims without a prior proposition dependency, I think arising from inductive inference, right? So fallible is false. I think because empirical knowledge can always be rev it's well, fib says empirical knowledge can always be revised by further observation. And any of the things that we take as knowledge might possibly turn out to be false. Well, I think if you take a law of identity really seriously, that's just not true because, um, there's no entity bearing, for example, the chromosomal marker XX that can be both a woman and a man at the same time, right? There's no entity bearing the chromosomal marker X Y that can be both a woman, a man, and a woman at the same time. And no one bearing a CHSO market X Y can bear children ever.
Speaker 1 00:18:16 So I don't think that can ever change. And I don't think you can fudge the science, or you can fudge the love of identity. That is an immutable fact of existence that cannot change. So the question of what is a woman is not something that can ever be altered from our knowledge base, because it's been not indeterminately, it's been determined in a fixated and immutable way by science. That is sex is determined, not by genitalia, but by chromosomal markers. And those, I don't think in any possible world I could ever change. So there's, there are immutable truthful answers that in any possible world can never be wrong, right? So if fall, if fall bism is false or on shaky grounds, then I think existential nihilism is nonsensical. It's kind of like an empty set because it's very utterance. Knowledge does not exist is a knowledge claim itself. It's, it's guilty of what I think ran might call a fall of a stolen concept. So it cancels itself out. It says knowledge is not possible, but it makes a knowledge claim that knowledge does not exist, which itself is a knowledge claim. Um, I really, really haven't done justice to what I wanted to say, but I, I hope what I submit some sense and maybe it much of what I really mean can be brought into sharper relief in our discussion.
Speaker 0 00:19:49 Thank you, Jason. Well, um, I definitely have to admit some of it was over my head, but probably not over the head of our founder. Uh, David Kelly, David, did you wanna comment? I'd have to unmute yourself. Maybe he's stepped away. Uh, alright, well, so, uh, we're gonna kick this open. If you would like to ask question of professor hill, please raise your hand. And, um, it can be about the, uh, technical aspects of, of the, uh, philosophical. Oh, there you are David.
Speaker 2 00:20:32 Yes. I just wanted to say I I'm, I'm gonna hold off a little bit. I have a lot to say about, um, uh, popper, um, but the, uh, but I I'm I'm, I don't feel I've gotten, uh, Jason's, uh, argument yet. So let me, let me hold on. Think about it and wait for some further comments and, uh, jump back in.
Speaker 0 00:21:02 I'm gonna go to, uh, Richard Salman next.
Speaker 4 00:21:05 Thank you, Jason. Thank you for this. I I'm trying to get clear the distinctions. If, if I hear you right, if fallible is the claim that, uh, certainty is not possible, and the popper approach is to say that verification is not possible. I still don't understand what, what is it, how does that relate to neoism? How is neoism verification distinguished from, uh, the other two
Speaker 1 00:21:40 Verification is possible for, for, um, proper, um, it's through falsification, it's through verification, falsification that we can, um, rule out certain claims, scientific claims and theories and render them, render them completely false. So he has a, he has a theory of falsification and corroboration. Um, and it's simply because things like psychoanalysis or religious dogmas, can't be verified. Mm-hmm <affirmative> there's no, there's no, there's no, there, there there's, there's nothing against, there's no backdrop against which you can sort of test the truth claims and there are no criteria objective criteria to adjudicate among the truth claims made by let's say psychoanalysis and the way that we can among two physicists or chem chemists who have competing hypotheses that are vying for theory, um, we can always say, okay, well, we have a set of objective criteria that we can use to verify and then falsify and then corroborate, um, through repeated experimentation through the verification process, right? Because if it's, if it's, if it's, if it yields one results in time a then needs see the same results in time, B C, D um, given certain circumstances. And if, if that's not the case, then we just, we just throw the, we throw out the theory.
Speaker 4 00:23:20 Yeah, I was. So he, yeah, I was under the impression that he in trying to answer the fallible list and, and yet not being able to validate certainty, took the position of that. Falsification was not the same thing as verification. And, and it seemed like his view was, I can't give you a theory of verifying with certainty that some proposition is true, but here's my technique. My technique is throw everything at it and try to falsify and refute it. And if it hasn't been refuted yet, then it stands as some kind of, it has some kind of status, but he still wouldn't say it's a status of certainty. It's just as, not yet thrown out, so to speak, not yet falsified, but Jason, let me just take a different tack quickly. Are you setting up proper relevant to your theme? Because you're saying he's a pathway to neoism or a barrier to it. Are you saying he's a good guy preventing us from being nihilists or are you discussing him from the standpoint of he's going to lead to that? I'm just trying to understand where you're going.
Speaker 1 00:24:29 Well, no, I think that, uh, if, if you take puppet seriously and I certainly do take him seriously that, um, we, we have to, we have to come back to something like, like his basic statement theory, uh, and, or basic sentiments that good scientists hold lead us back to something like in a very circuitous way, lead us right back to, um, inductive inference inferences as a base of knowledge, and therefore the epistemological NIS, which some have thought to be genetically related to the fallible lists have no basis at all. So I I'm going, I'm going to ultimately say that epistemological nihilism is an, is, is nonsense. It's ridiculous because there, there have been some scientists or philosophers of science who have said that epistemological nihilism. I mean, I've read this epistemological nihilism, um, owes some of its legitimacy to the fallible list who are not nihilists at all, but who undercut epistemologically ways of knowing in a particular manner that it just doesn't fall short of certainty.
Speaker 1 00:25:51 It holds at sort of, there's a sort of tentativeness to all our knowledge claims. Um, that is that that goes beyond mere skepticism. It's almost as if, and it's, it falls just short of relativism them. And that Papa really comes right back to his theory of corroboration and his idea that when we are caught in a sort of dispute between the proposition statements that we make. And, um, um, what, when we, when observation here basically clash, um, and the question arises, how are scientists supposed to decide whether to discard the fear around the grounds that the observation intention, uh, are to be trusted or observation on the grounds that it has been generated through? You know, do this experiments we can use, we can fall back on what he claims to be a certain class of observation statements that he calls that we decide to accept.
Speaker 1 00:27:01 We being the community of scientists, what he calls basic statements. And I'm gonna argue that see Papa, your basic statements really are nothing, but what you thought you were rejecting in the first place. Those basic statements are inferential, inductive inferences. Um, they're, they're, they're not the kinds of stuff. They're not the sort of things that are subjected to, uh, the tight, the knit rat form of reasoning that we find deductive reasoning. Those basic statements, um, is built, are built on group agreement on a sort of consensus. And so he falls back on a kind of circular reasoning. He really goes right back to something like, although he wouldn't admit it, this I'm saying this isn't escapable, he goes back to something like inductive inferences, that form the stuff of, out of which those basic statements are. And so epistemological M cannot claim to be genetically related to fallible at all. Um, there's something else that has to be, has to be going on. So I sort of trying to doing a, a WeDo process of trying to, I don't like I, I'm not in PA's camp, but I re I, I take him seriously. I teach him, I respect him, um, suspend his mind, but I still think that in the end, he comes back to something like with this basic statements, he does come back to something that is predicated on inductive inferences.
Speaker 4 00:28:38 Thanks, Jason, that's clarifying. Thank you.
Speaker 2 00:28:47 I just wanted to follow up on, on the last round of discussion, uh, with Richard and, and, uh, Jason, the observation statements, uh, in my understanding, um, is that Papa subscribed to what's called the, uh, that perception is the theory Laden. It is, it's not a direct, uh, preconceptual awareness of reality from, from which we form concepts and proposition in theories, but it's already theory is involved in the, in the actual perception. Now that's something that I think is UN unfounded. Um, I, Steven Hicks wrote if I remember correctly, <laugh>, um, his thesis, uh, PhD thesis, uh, focused on that question and maybe among others, but, and so I totally disagree. I think there are basic statements. Socrates was a man is not one of them because none of us witness Socrates, none of us have had any direct awareness of Socrates. We're relying on a chain of historical information that we've learned.
Speaker 2 00:30:01 And our trust in that chain is rest partly on induction, but you can't do that all the way for every observation statement. And, uh, um, but if, if, like, just wanna check if I understand, but what you're saying, um, Jason, if the observation statements from on which science is founded or which are used in the process of reputation, um, are there are the ones that, um, the community of scientists, uh, are accept and that's why, what makes it kind of collective, um, relativism? Well, doesn't it, I would say it takes induction to know what the community of scientist believes, because, you know, how do you know you, you read one theorist, you read another, you learn about science and you get a sense of what the, uh, consensus is at any one time, but that's, that's an induction. That's a generalization. Is that, is that, am I getting close to your point?
Speaker 1 00:31:09 That's my point. Yes, yes, yes,
Speaker 2 00:31:11 Yes. Okay, great. Thanks. All right. Um, more to say about popper, but I'll, I'll, uh, sign off for now and, uh, take other
Speaker 0 00:31:25 Great Lawrence.
Speaker 5 00:31:28 Yeah. Uh, thank you, Jason, for doing this. Um, I never studied popper while, uh, in school, so excuse my ignorance here. I'm just trying to make sure I think you've already clarified it enough, but just to make sure when it comes to knowledge or understanding as, as David pointed out as more of a collective agreement, sort of like the, the current collective agrees that this knowledge is true for the moment until something else comes around, that the collective finally ultimately accepts as the true new knowledge and abandons the old one. So everything's more of like a subjective utility based structure where knowledge is only good, as long as the majority of people accept it. Is that, is that what I'm, uh, am I writing that assertion?
Speaker 1 00:32:17 Uh, not, not exactly because that would make pop come across as a sort of pragmatist or, um, a Julian or which I, I, I would hesitate to put him in that camp. It would make it sound like knowledge is what works. It, it turns, it turns to your question just more like a psychological one, like knowledge is what works and the minds of the scientists. And, um, no, I think that there are independent scientists who are out there doing their own thing, and they're, they're working and they're working in their laboratories. And, um, the issue of an appeal to something like a consensus or something like basic statements that we rely on will only arise when there is sufficient clash between observation and theory among these individual scientists. So UNR scientist, Dave, as a scientist, Jack as a scientist, and we're, you know, we're working on our stuff.
Speaker 1 00:33:21 And, um, he says it does not rest on a, a solid bedrock, right? So he's already discounted the idea that science doesn't prove anything. It just falsifies what we think we know. Um, but it doesn't, it doesn't rest on this solid bedrock. It rests on sort of like a P piles in a swamp. And that these piles that are stuck in a swamp, give us something to grip on a sort of foundation, a sort of, um, contingent or tentative foundation. Um, but once, but once there is a tension between the observation in theory, um, what, what do we do? Um, let's say that we have, have had a set of good reasons for accepting so far in the theory, the state of the theory, um, we've thrown a lot of things, but it's a skeletal, um, theory that we're holding onto. Um, what do we do, um, when a certain class of observational statements clash with the theory and in that as a last resort?
Speaker 1 00:34:38 I think, I think he means that as a last resort, we decide to use a certain class of observation statements, namely the ones that we accept as the basis for the falsification of theories. So we would, we would appeal to everyone, all the scientists in the room as, and as the, the, as constitute in the criteria for falsifying the theories based on what he would call their basic statements, which, which, which it's not arbitrary. It's not subjective. It's not, you know, Popper's not a subjective, it's, he's not, there's nothing arbitrary about this. This is based on seasoned well, reasoned, well thought out, uh, set of statements or viewpoints or scientific, um, perspectives that we fall on. Um, so it's not, I don't want it to sound like it's something pragmatic or something like, um, if it, if it just works in the minds of these scientists, it's, it's, it's cuz that would make it sound too psychological or make him sound like a pist, which I don't think there's anything pragmatic about, um, characteristic logic extreme. It doesn't strike as being very, very pragmatic here. It's just when there's a clash between the theory and the observation, um, to such an extent, what are we, what are we going to rely on for the falsification of the theory? And it's, it's these basic statements among scientists.
Speaker 0 00:36:22 So, uh, Jason, thank you for that. Uh, other than you and, um, Richard and David, uh, probably, um, if someone else wants to raise your hand, let us know otherwise, but I think that your level of philosophical and theoretical knowledge about Popp and its connection to neoism in the culture, it's probably many orders above the rest of us in, in this room. So wanting to try to make sure that, um, that others in the room are able to gain some value from this conversation. So, um, perhaps you could, you gave that excellent example of, uh, you know, transgender, uh, identity versus the biological facts. Maybe could you give some other examples of, of how this, um, this dichotomy that you're talking about is manifests in, in the culture and some of the, the current debates,
Speaker 1 00:37:20 Right? Right. Well, one, one of the reasons I'm gonna reject theological nihilism, right, is because it, it clearly has, has no BA it has no BA it has no basis for accepting the basic axioms of existence. It has no basis for accepting the law of identity, the lot of causality. And if epistemological M says, knowledge just does not exist. And if it, even if it does exist, it's just not attainable to human beings. And one of the reasons it's not attainable to human beings is because there's no reference to which it corresponds. Like there's no real reality out there to which, um, it sort of corresponds. And I gave a transgender example or the, the, the example of a, not the transgender of a woman really, and a man as a basis for denying that, that is, there is real knowledge of the world that we have that I don't think any experience could actually change.
Speaker 1 00:38:19 Um, which is a claim that fallible makes actually that, um, knowledge is always open-ended some, some types of knowledge is open-ended because empirical data could be forthcoming that could change it. And I, I, I would wanna push fib a little bit more and say, no, just undercut epistemological ledge and say, no, there are certain types of knowledge that are absolutely ONAS, saleable, immutable that no experience of any type in the world could ever change that. And one, one example I would give is that no entity bearing an X, Y chromosomal marker can ever has ever, or will ever be able to give birth to a child. That's just an Ausable form of knowledge that we have about the status of an entity called a male. And so this kind of nihilism advanced by the epistemological nihilism is kind of, you know, there is no knowledge and there's no reference in the world. Yeah. We do have a reference it's called a male. Uh, there are criteria or there's one criterion that we use to distinguish between the sexes. It's not genitalia, it's chromosomal markers. Those are unchanging, no kind of experience. Whether I meet someone who thinks he's a woman, when he is really a man or a man who thinks vice, you know, you get the picture is not ever going to change that fact in the world at all.
Speaker 6 00:40:02 Hey, J can I have a question?
Speaker 1 00:40:05 Yeah.
Speaker 6 00:40:06 Are you familiar with the book? I think it's called on postmodernism by Dr. Steven Hicks.
Speaker 1 00:40:12 Oh, absolutely. Of course. I know Steven H so I've read that book several times.
Speaker 6 00:40:17 Yeah. And to me it does make quite a bit of sense, basically his underlying, um, premise is that because the, uh, I guess you could say, um, one form of, of left wing thought Marxism, or, um, I suppose economic Marxism, where, where, where, um, political and, and economic, ah, more, more likely economic, um, uh, uh, conduct O on behalf of the government, um, where, where the rubber really re meets the road, where, where things are carried out on a very, um, basic every day sort of shopping and selling, buying, and selling sort of thing, a very practical manner. Uh, Steven, uh, I'm just making a, a, just giving, setting this up for everyone in the room who hasn't read the book, but he said, Steven basically said, you know, the Marxist lost, um, their argument, uh, of, of, of a sort of left wing utopia ideal because when they, uh, tried to exercise, um, uh, non capitalist sort of controlled, centrally controlled, um, uh, economic systems, they failed miserably.
Speaker 6 00:41:38 And it, and it led to horrible, um, suffering, um, for the simple fact that nobody knew basically prices were determined by the state and it, it, it created all these problems. So, um, the vast majority of, of intellectuals and, and those on the left sort of quit, um, uh, preaching, uh, very far left gospel. Um, but there was a small group that, uh, remained faithful to the cause and, and they just really couldn't, they really couldn't give up on, um, uh, Marxist ideals. And so rather than conceding defeat, uh, it's Hicks, um, idea that they said, okay, well, if we, if, if, if, if Marxist ideals don't work in the real world, then basically the real world itself does not exist then. Uh, so I, I think a lot of what you're talking about, um, this, this age of nihilism, it's probably brought to us, uh, at least partially brought to us, um, through the, uh, multiple, um, do you a little non-truths of, of, of, of, uh, of, uh, very far leftist, um, postmodern thought that nothing, no one particular, uh, is more truthful or less truthful than anything else, if you could, to that Jason, Jason,
Speaker 0 00:43:15 To, um, comment. Thank you.
Speaker 1 00:43:19 I think that's true, but I think that predates Marxism, I think it goes back to, um, um, the, um, I actually would, would think that it goes back to Dick heart and the modern period, um, and people feel free to sort of correct me if I think I'm going way too back in history. But I think, I think poodle <laugh> that, um, that it goes back to the, the whole issue of the primacy of consciousness over existence, uh, in the, in the, in the, the early modern period of philosophy. Because with that notion in mind that existence does not predate consciousness, that existence is not something that consciousness discovers, but existence is something that consciousness creates. Um, if you, if you tick that idea really, really seriously, uh, it's a cancellation of the whole idea of objectivity, and maybe to go through a series of reasoning processes to show how that very ideal the primacy of consciousness over existence can lead to the absence of the objectivity.
Speaker 1 00:44:40 And once we accept that there is no objective world out there that the world is endlessly malleable and bendable, like pieces of potty that can conform can takes us up quite seriously in his work. Um, then the Marxist really have a made the Marxist. The left is really had a ready, made work and, and mystics really had a ready made world world for them. I mean, I would not even, I don't even think Augustine or Plato, um, were responsible for this because, well, I won't say take too long to explain this, but I think Decart was the one who philosophically in a systematic way, um, set up this kind of problem, um, by attacking the idea of an objective reality that consciousness exists, that a consciousness that's aware of its own consciousness and then proceeds from, and you proceed from that premise, uh, is something quite dubious, uh, dubious occurrence in the history of philosophy.
Speaker 1 00:45:50 And that made it possible for something like the postmodernist, the Marxist, um, the epistemological nihilists, uh, to then go on and today's walk supremacist today, go on and create reality. I mean, anything that my feelings constitute reality, right? My ideas about my myself, what I, my aspiration identity supersedes, what I really am, you know, I can say, I want to be this and say, that's what I really am and anything counts. And it's given a sort of ontological status today, um, because we've sort of knocked out the idea that reality is the final AR arbitrary is the final judge in any kind of utterance or any kind of truth claim that we're making. So I, I would, I would really go back to, to the, to the, to the early modern period of philosophy as, as the root cause.
Speaker 6 00:46:43 Yes, I, I agree with you. Um, and I'll just say this one last thing and I'll shut up. Um, I think that, you know, one of the primary driving forces of the postmodern very car left is this sort of, um, guilt of those to feel bad for those who have left out or find a cause or reason for, for the world not being equal and good. Um, and I just find that more, as you're saying, like a feelings sort of thing, where as if we look back, um, since the industrial revolution life has become so much tremendously better, um, in the last 150 years for nearly every human being, including the very most poor among amongst us and to turn, um, to allow ourselves to be, um, taken up by the suggestions of wanna get everyone in here. Yeah. I'll, I I'll shut up in a second. I, I, I suppose, you know, the world's not yet perfect, but we we've got made it so much better through clear thinking and, and, um, that's why I have a real problem with these, uh, uh, folks who make suggestions that, you know, everything's subjective, we've benefited so much from the laws of nature and, and, and objective scientific research is what I wanna think.
Speaker 0 00:48:11 Thank you. Well, um, as I like to say, to be objective, you have to have perspective and a bit of gratitude would also help to, um, to provide context for where we are, uh, and, uh, be a counter against neoism. But, um, we have, uh, 10 minutes left. We're gonna have some housekeeping to get to at the end. So last two people we have on stage with,
Speaker 7 00:48:39 Thank you. One thing that has been floating around this discussion is the distinction between social knowledge and individual knowledge. And, uh, in the end, particularly as an objectiveist knowledge is individual in the first instance, and is only by way of our character as a social animal, that we relate to other people and ask other people or learn from other people or rely on other people. So there's a social knowledge, that's secondary and individual knowledge. That's primary. That's my first point, the second one. And this is a sophomore it's it's because I'm not trained in philosophy. It seems to me that, um, if you went to the period before the invention of a microscope and applied the empirical method, or some kind of positivism to the question of the existence of bacteria, somebody deduces somehow that bacteria exists because people get sick or whatever, and claim that they exist. And the empiricist says, well, that's belief is no better than belief in the Easter bunny until the tools of knowledge come along and improve the ability to perceive in different ways. That is the microscope. So that's my two points. Thank you.
Speaker 0 00:50:17 Thanks, Jason, did you have, do you wanna comment matter
Speaker 1 00:50:21 Just briefly? I, I'm not sure what to make of the idea of individual knowledge versus knowledge. I mean, is the codification of facts, briefly knowledge is the codification of facts in the world. And as Rand said, truth is the epistemological concept that we, that, that, that we devise to correspond to how we in codify interpret those, those facts. Um, so I think we, we sort of, um, we apprehend and we, we, we, we, we perceive knowledge individually, but, um, knowledge is neutral. I mean, knowledge is if it's knowledge, it's, it's something, if that is, if it's a codification of facts, then constitutes a body that then constitutes, constitutes a body of, of, of real knowledge. I think it's, it's, I don't see the distinction between social and an individual. It, it becomes social when it becomes, if by socially, you mean it becomes widely accepted and dispersed and becomes part of cultural norms.
Speaker 7 00:51:26 If I might jump in Jason, I think it's really just, it's a, it is a simpler and lower level point than that. It's just that the entire subject of epistemology has this problem of arguments between the group knowledge and the individual's knowledge. I, I just want to keep it at that very simple level. The perception and conception is fundamentally individual. I'll leave it there. Okay.
Speaker 1 00:51:56 Okay. All
Speaker 0 00:51:59 Norm, thanks for your patience norm, if you wanna unmute, we'd love to hear from you, if not, um, uh, Scott, you've been quietly listening, but I can hear you thinking. So
Speaker 9 00:52:22 <laugh>, um, yeah, I'm just, uh, you know, I guess I just was hoping you could expand on the idea that so is to, to Richard's earlier point, is, is popper responsible for, uh, with that lack of certainty that now we have people saying that that women can have babies and, and also, you know, is there some of it that's technological, could we create some sort of artificial uterus or something that could make it at least technologically possible for, uh, someone, uh, that wasn't without those chromosomes to do the act, even though it wouldn't be the same, uh, you know, per nature?
Speaker 1 00:53:13 Um, no, I don't think so. I mean, would it be technologically possible for someone with an X, Y chromosome marker to give birth to a child? No, I don't. It's just don't. I mean, I'm just gonna stick to the love of identity and say that a thing is a thing, and it is what it is, and that, um, devising some sort of technological apparatus, um, elaborate technological apparatus that you could put a fix to a man's body, uh, would not, would be, would be so artificial and be, so it, it wouldn't be an organic, um, realization of the creation of a fetus inside of a man's body. That's what I mean. So I'm gonna say in, no, God, I, I, I think that's an immutable, unable fact of existence and, um, uh, and whatta dragons, Kubota dragon. Hmm.
Speaker 0 00:54:11 What about his question as to, uh, whether, uh, Popp bear's responsibility for this subjectivity?
Speaker 1 00:54:21 Uh, no, I don't think so. I, you know, the reason I, the whole reason I brought a Popp was to sort of try to save him from a lot of criticism that he gets from, uh, the idea that the uncertainty principle that in hears in science is sort of responsible for a kind of crisis and epistemology the epistemological NIS. I, I wanted to try to save popper and in the end by saying that, look with this basic statements, he really, really has to come back to some sort of, um, inductive inferences in his scientific method. Um, and so Lee Popp alone people <laugh>. Um, so I, I was, I, I was just trying to sort of like be very systematic, um, and answer the question or respond to the charges that popper is Popper's epistemological Phib Phib is somehow responsible for epistemological nihilism. I mean, these are questions that I'm considered in graduate school and papers on it.
Speaker 1 00:55:29 And I think the answer is no. Um, so I just wanted to sort of clear the way so that when I get to the next time, which is I'm really gonna talk about moral nihilism. Um, but I think one has to answer certain epistemological questions. Like, how do, so how do we know this? You know, and if we can show that epistemological nihilism is just empty and dead and nonsensical, it makes no, no more sense than asking the question, prove that I exist. Um, then I can find other ways of showing that there is something called moral nihilism. It's not derived from epistemological nihilism, and it's certainly not derived from fatalism. Um, but, um, so the, the, the whole purpose of today really was to sort of Def defend FISM against certain charges that have, that have been leveled against it. That is a kind of relativism, which I don't think it is.
Speaker 1 00:56:27 Um, I'm responsible for the crisis and epitol epistemology crisis of meaning the crisis of knowing the crisis of the objectivity. Um, and to try to do it in a sort of, in my, at least in, I don't know if it came across, but to try to do it in my mind in a sort of systematic way so that when I get to the more interesting non-technical, I promise you very, very society driven, examples of moral nihilism, which we really deal with the age of nihilism in America. Um, I'll have a clear understanding of seeing that that's not in any way back to fallible at all. That's its own thing.
Speaker 0 00:57:07 All right, well, we're looking forward to that. Uh, I thank Jason Hill, our senior scholar for, uh, this wonderful lesson in philosophy. And, uh, of course our founder, David Kelly, and, uh, appreciate also Richard Salman, our senior scholar for joining the room. And I'm going hand it off to Scott. Who's gonna tell bit about what we have store
Speaker 9 00:57:34 Great. I'm looking forward to next week, uh, Tuesday at 4:00 PM Eastern on clubhouse Lawrence, and I will be discussing the power of momentum to start, uh, moving the culture in our direction at 7:00 PM. Tuesday, Rob Tru Zinsky will be discussing the objective case for democracy in quotes. Uh, Wednesday at 5:00 PM Eastern, the Atlas society asks will feature JAG interviewing well known objectiveist and actor, mark peg Greeno, uh, Thursday at 4:00 PM. Eastern background clubhouse, uh, senior scholar, Richard Salzman will be discussing inflation essence cause and cure. Uh, we've also got our gala coming up October 6th in Malibu, honoring Michael sailor, Bitcoin king. Uh, we're gonna have panels with the scholars during the day. I'm really looking forward to it. And, uh, we hope to see you at some of these events. Uh, thank you everyone for doing this Ja any, uh, final thoughts?
Speaker 0 00:58:36 Uh, no, that that's great. Of course. Um, to those of you who in the room who have supported the out society, uh, big, thank you. We appreciate it. And, uh, those who haven't and, uh, believe in this kind of content and wanting to help us introduce others to the ideas of please consider, uh, adding a tip on the ATLA society site to help support our work. So appreciate it.
