Episode Transcript
Speaker 0 00:00:01 Okay. So the last time we spoke, all right. So in the, the first it of this talk that I gave, I sort of explained why I think Russia is our enemy, that it, um, just as just a, a brief recap of the last, um, the talk I gave that there is indisputable evidence that was corroborated by, by Trump's own national intelligence agencies that Russia interfered in our 2016 national elections, um, that Russia over the past 20 years has carried out, uh, 20 years of cyber attacks against our pipelines and our banks. Um, that, and I went into great detail the last time about talking about why a violation of our electoral process is actually a declaration of war against the people, because it's an invasion of our sovereign and autonomous, the autonomous and sovereign fair <affirmative>, which within which we make our decisions and shape our destinies and the laws that, that fly an influence in shaping our destiny.
Speaker 0 00:01:11 Um, and I outlined why Russia had to be punished. So I'm operating on the premise and I will talk a little bit more about that, that Russia has already declared war against America, um, by, in interfering in our national elections, by a series of cyber attacks, um, that it has carried out over the past 20 years against our institutions, um, industrial and financial institutions. That the only reason I suppose, America has not acknowledged the fact that Russia has, has cured wars is out of political expediency. So, um, what I want to talk a little bit about today is the, um, the idea of this new liberal world order that emerged after world war II of which America was the main architect and why it's really important to keep that liberal world order in place as a way of maintaining both American power and American supremacy.
Speaker 0 00:02:17 Um, given the fact that I do think indisputably that Russia already has declared war on America, on American institutions, why the maintenance of this world order is even now more important today are as important today as it certainly was back in 19, uh, 43 45. So, you know, as Roosevelt stated in 1943, after those proposals were drawn a a for a postwar network in the Pacific and Atlantic, he said, uh, quote, if the USA did not pull the fangs of the predatory animals of this world, they would multiply and grown strength and would be at our throat once more in a short generation post quote. So the new world order was designed to, to disallow or to prevent a sort of a return to a state of affairs that produce two world wars and state of affairs that threatened American, not just American supremacy, but American democratic values and the American capitalist system.
Speaker 0 00:03:28 So America is not safe in a world where Europe is threatened by even one hostile, uh, autocratic power, I believe. And it is, is in our national south interest, I believe to defeat Russia because part of its manifest destiny is to undermine American democracy and to also undermine democracies around the world. That's part of what Russia does as its manifest destiny. I gave a talk on clubhouse several months ago about, uh, what a new manifest destiny on America's part would look like, which is a topic of my next book. Um, it's a 700 page book on American foreign policy, the normative implications of an ethical, what an ethical foreign policy would look like. Unlike a lot of objectives. I do believe that foreign policy is a philosophical issue. And I, I do make that case in, in that forthcoming book. So it is in our national self interest to defeat Russia because part of its manifest destiny is to undermine our democracy.
Speaker 0 00:04:28 Furthermore, the arch, I argue that the, I would say that the architectural security, um, uh, of Europe is linked inextricably linked to or national self interest, right? So we are, we are co inated, I think, in a nexus of causal relationships. Uh, and we saw this after 9 1 1 how the shared intelligence among the nations, um, helped us to expedite a series of security networks in place that were very, very, very efficient. So if the architectural security of Europe or any of our allies really is threatened or national self-interest is also threatened because of our co in what I would call an nexus of causal causal relationships. So if Putin's global manifest testing of undermining democracy around the world goes unchecked. Uh, I think Rob, um, in his really, really enlightening and, and great, uh, debate with Richard talked about, uh, Habi and international, um, state of nature.
Speaker 0 00:05:39 I completely, uh, agree with that, that it left on check. It creates a Bian international anarchical, uh, state of, of nature. I mean, the global sphere is already an anarchical state of nature since there is no supernational or transnational bodies to really govern it. Uh, we have international law, we have international court of justice and we have international world court and we have these norms and protocols, but there's no really overarching enforcing agency, uh, to en enforce these, these codified protocols and norms and laws, an anarchical state of nature, which compromises America's, I would say, ability to navigate itself in the world, um, on the economic front to say nothing of, of the matter of shared intelligence, uh, is pretty scary because we are not as independent as we think we are. I think as Eli lake points out in a recent article, I believe it was in commentary.
Speaker 0 00:06:44 If my memory serves me correctly, he's he says that Russian, China and other dictatorships actually abuse Interpols Interpol system for alerting the world about criminal fugitives, that they go about issuing red notices for their opponents while they Harbor hackers and arms dealers and, and other thugs. Um, so Russia really is a, a threat to the community of nations. And we are in a cold war with a country who's capitalism, Moscow. So Russia is a, is a sinkhole is a sinkhole country, political politically. It's a sinkhole, it's a, both a reverted state and inverted state. And it's a drained system that I think brings down the civilizational quality of the continent. And the effect on our allies will be, I think, in indescribable, right? It's sort of ecological, it's EC ecological political ball, uh, like any rogue state certainly is. And I think moral political rogue states remove the possibility of a lasting piece by in some sense, subjugating human beings in the global commons to continuous fear by exposing them directly to, to the threat of war, uh, by compromising or destroying those institutions that are devoted to keeping a peaceful world order and a balance of, of, of power among the U what I would, what I would call or what I call in my book, the union of moral nations and states devoted to peaceful international relat and, and also by inflicting brutality in opposition, um, or oppression really against, uh, against their own people.
Speaker 0 00:08:33 Um, so I I'm gonna, this might rank some people, but one of my, you know, heroes is the former secretary. I think he was the 51st secretary of state D um, stated the situation very clearly. He said that, you know, we live in the middle of an increasingly connected interconnected world. And, uh, we would be invariably dragged into conflicts whether we wish to be or not. And our interests, therefore broadly speaking, uh, constitutes involved or broadly speaking involves keeping Europe safe by extending our security frontier, many, many miles, thousands of miles away from our shores into areas where threats are likely to emerge. So in one sense, um, our grant strategy in creating the new liberal international world world order, um, after world war II, uh, was, and I think still remains one that, uh, speaks to being proactive and not just being passive. So I would say yes, that our role as a leader is to shape international environment and not just to passively react to it because there are just too many egregious and nefarious manifest Destin is out there in the world.
Speaker 0 00:10:03 Uh, it is not in our national self interest to have Russia, uh, partner with Iran. I spoke about that the last time in some detail, um, and it is not in our national self interest to have Russia use its veto at the UN security council to protect its Syrian ally, right, which it did in 2013. Um, so as Aon says in the world as its constituted back in 19 first 45, when he made a statement, the only guarantee of peace was the continue it moral military and economic power of United States. And you describe United States as the locomotive at the head of, of mankind, um, which I can, I, I agree with that. So sort of liberal progress that has been made in Europe, and again, you know, the civiliz the civilized countries in Europe, uh, Mo most of the countries in Europe, I would say are civilized.
Speaker 0 00:11:05 Most of, at least the ones that are, we are allied with re require, uh, the liberal progress require that the us continue to back this international, this international order and to access exercise power. That includes, you know, broad spheres of influence, really broad spheres of influence. So our responsibility as a world power, uh, if you were to remain one requires maintaining a global, let me just say it out outright. It requires maintaining global law and order because an anarchical Heian state of nature is a state that is inimical to America, national self interest on all fronts. And I think that Russia, um, presents such a threat, this idea that NATO and an expansive NATO eastward, or either the existence of NATO or the expansion of NATO eastward, is what has caused or has contributed to the R or the wrath or the anchor of Putin, I think is untrue.
Speaker 0 00:12:10 Uh, Putin has gone on record and stated that he does not in any way consider the boundaries drawn after world war II as legitimate. That is the carving up of form into the Soviet union. And he does not respect the boundaries before world war II, as legitimate, which speaks to the idea that really what he to do is recon constitute a massive, um, Russian empire. Um, so the, the notion that Fu would be our friend, if we either with the deriv from NATO, uh, neutralized NATO, or if NATO hadn't existed at all is I think, um, a bunch of Maar <affirmative>. Um, so in the end, I think that no authoritarian regime will or can remain the friend of America any more than a, a thug, a criminal or a thief can be friends with an honest and a good person, because the difference is in fundamental values will inevitably drive.
Speaker 0 00:13:16 And I, and Sal the wedge between the two sources. So, you know, the question is what, what can we do? What I, I spoke at land last two weeks ago, about some of the measures that we could take, um, some of which included, um, making sure that, um, increase the sanctions doubly, um, banning Russia, of course keep, keep banning Russia from, from, uh, Russian banks from swift, from the society for worldwide interbank, financial telecommunications and crippling its ability to trade with most of the world. Um, I would add some other things too. I would say that in some sense, we work on, and this is probably quite contentious, but we work on expelling Russia from the UN or the security council. And I think I'm going to agree with Eli lake when he says that, um, Western nations should, um, promote the idea really of demoting Russia status.
Speaker 0 00:14:27 Um, speaking about the UN that Western diplomats should real explore the, the, the prospect of demoting Russia status on the grounds that there was no general assembly vote for Russia to join the UN after the collapse of the Soviet union, right. There was just no general assembly vote for Russia to join the UN uh, if that doesn't work, um, we should issue an ultimatum it's Russia or us, and the us cannot, or will not demote Russia's status in the west, led by America should undertake to build an alternative to United nations. Um, <affirmative> that excludes Russia eventually China. I mean, I, I wholeheartedly have two chapters on why Russia and China should be expelled from the UN and strategic logical about doing this. I also think that, um, we, if Russia, if Russia continues Surt and not so surreptitiously with its attacks, cyber attacks, we, we continue with counter cyber attack, um, that we continue to arm Ukraine to the maximum.
Speaker 0 00:15:44 And I think just today, I just pulled it off of the, um, internet that the us and its allies, I, I know shipping, I think this was published in the wall street journal today, large volumes of very heavy weapon rate to Ukraine, including much more advanced Western systems to supplement the sort of light weapons that the, um, that were being supplied during the Soviet era arms. Um, so the Soviet weaponry that were being funneled into Ukraine and Biden has asked for 33 billion more to fund, uh, weaponry to the Ukraine. I think that is perfectly legitimate. Um, I would also, I would also, um, there have been volunteers, um, that have been contracted. I, we can call them contracted Merc areas from private companies or any voluntary set of troops, um, that would like to go to the Ukraine. They should be a mass at the border, um, at every section of the Ukraine border Ukrainian border.
Speaker 0 00:16:54 Um, and also that we should be using, um, we, should you be using our emphasis in ways that can sort of, um, as monitoring agencies or emphasis as monitoring agencies to keep abreast of freedom movements inside of Russian support them in any way possible. This is the point that I think lake touched on and I have written on before, um, to use our emphasis as, as these agencies to monitor freedom movements inside Russia, and to support them, um, in any way that we can, that would undermine, um, Putin's efficacy and his capacity to, to rule, um, is one other, um, point that I made last week that I wanted to just reiterate. And that is, um, the fact that, uh, Russia views, not just NATO, but he views the, the, the USA and the west as his enemies. So this idea that somehow Russia can be brought within the Pantheon of moral nations and be made a friend is just not the case.
Speaker 0 00:18:11 Um, Russia has threatened the U us several times, or Putin has threatened the us several times and has no threatened two of our allies, Finland and Sweden who have remained neutral, but have applied for membership or seen to be on the verge of applying for membership into NATO. Um, the idea also that, um, NATO is a threat to Russia, has to be challenged in the sense that NATO has never threatened Russia. Okay. NATO has never threatened Russia, even during the cold war period. It was just a defense, a defensive, a Alliance, and it's, it was configured in such a way for defense while everybody knows those are the war, so PAC or the opposite. So, um, Russia would have no fear of NATO. Were it not hero nation, Sweden doesn't fair NATO, moral nations, don't fair NATO. Russia has the reasons for fear NATO because it's a belligerent, um, sinkhole road nation.
Speaker 0 00:19:23 Um, so I just there's so much to say, but I let's see I've been going on for a little bit more than 15 minutes, 20 minutes. And I always, I always try not to talk for more than 15 minutes. Um, I want to reiterate the fact that Russia has already declared war on America. This is something that I've gotten a lot of pushback for. There are various ways in which nations can declare war on other nations. Russia has declared war on America through cyber attacks, through its interference in our national elections. Now whether we it's strategically or through politically it's politic, whether it's political expedient for us to identify this as an act of war is up to intelligence national intelligence and, uh, uh, uh, the governing bodies in our, in our institution. But one can reasonably say that those acts constitute, um, acts of war. And, um, so we're already in a cold war situation with Russia, and we have every obligation to defeat Russia either by proxy or by other means necessary. Um, so I wanted to say a little bit more about the importance of the international liberal world order and how America's inextricably linked America's self-interest is really inextricably linked to the maintenance of that international world order, but perhaps that will come out in the questions. Um, um, so I'll stop there. Mm.
Speaker 1 00:21:08 All right. Thank you, Jason. Um, and thanks, uh, Scott for joining me up here. Um, thanks to those of you who've, uh, raised your hand. Um, first I just wanted to see Scott, if you had any questions or, uh, reflections, otherwise I'll go. Yeah, I,
Speaker 2 00:21:27 I just, uh, I do wanna ask something about the liberal order because, uh, I do think there is a lot of value to it, but there's also been a type of, um, you know, us paying for everything in the other countries. I mean, they're starting to, since Russia, but, you know, I, I think that maybe this is a time for us to, uh, stand our ground with them a little bit as well in, in reassessing the, the value of this order and, and what everyone's pitching in.
Speaker 0 00:21:59 True. That would be a question that would not be a question of principle. That would be a question of strategy. And that would be sort of, that would not be questioning the principle or the, the, the rightness or the legitimacy of the liberal world order. That would just be a matter of how it's been allowed to function or who who's paying for what, or who's, who's shouldering the, the majority of the burden. So that's a question of, um, both expediency and function, uh, operations. It's a question of operations really, and not a question of principles. So I agree with you, Scott, that, uh, other countries need to pull their weight a little bit more. Um, I'm not a fan of president Trump, as I think everybody knows, but one of the good things that president Trump did during his, um, administration was to sort of call on the European nations to start, um, paying their fair share, um, and increasing their defense spending. Um, so I agree with you, but that is, that's more an, an initial strategy and not an issue principle. So yeah, we, you and I would, would probably agree on that.
Speaker 1 00:23:08 Thank you.
Speaker 0 00:23:09 But the centrality of the world, the liberal world order, I take to be on honest and on a, on honest sale, but good in the world.
Speaker 1 00:23:21 Uh, okay. People aren't speaking, please mute yourself. And I wanna remind, um, everyone, if, uh, you're enjoying the conversation, please share it, share it on clubhouse. Um, share it on Twitter or Facebook. Uh, that would be awesome. Clark, always love to see you here.
Speaker 4 00:23:41 Thank you, JAG. I appreciate, I love being here too, but, uh, I have to say I, uh, emphatically, but, uh, respectfully disagree, uh, with, uh, professor hill. I, uh, there's a lot there of course, but let me just start with world war II itself. I mean, we, we were taught, I was taught, uh, in public school, uh, last century when I attended that basically Brit and appeased, uh, and failed to confront, uh, the Nazis, uh, in 19 38, 19 39, the Munich and that year long run up to world Wari. But when I looked into it, not that many years ago, it turns out, you know, the British, like the us, they were totally Kasian status by the late, uh, 1930s, both in domestic policy and internationally in foreign policy. So it wasn't appeasement, which led to world war II. If, if you really dig down into the details, it was the British war guarantee to Poland.
Speaker 4 00:24:40 And I think they also threw one into Romania and some other country that was escaping right now. But that war guarantee March 31st, 1939, just just about five months before, uh, the Germans invaded Poland that had <laugh> a whole lot of bad consequences. The main one being, it had the effect of making Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia sign a non aggression packed. So add that to the list of all the, a unintended consequences that Kasian stateism produces, which of course we can see even, you know, build back better and things today. So the bottom line is, and, and again, I don't wanna go on too long, but the bottom line is really what I Rand said. And of course she was, uh, let's see, she would've been about 35 years old when, when world war II broke out, uh, she had the right, I D you don't aid either side, you don't pick winners and losers.
Speaker 4 00:25:30 Let the two bad guys really bad guys. Imor guys let them fight it out and basically destroy each other. But, but the bottom line is here. Here's my final point. Uh, unlike what I was taught in public school, growing up the Soviet union, one world war II, almost single handedly in both theaters. And I see the arena is, uh, is on deck. So, uh, thank you, Irina <laugh>. We don't here in America. We never acknowledged the fact that it was almost a Soviet union, single handedly. In fact, it was the groups that are now fighting today in, in the blood. They called them the Bloodlands Ukraine, the Belarusians and, and the Russian came together to stick it to, I mean, really those are the people we can thank for why Western Europe isn't speaking German today, or at least wasn't, you know, many years after world war II.
Speaker 4 00:26:18 So, so it turns out, yeah, Soviet union, almost single handedly won world war II. They, you know, they were the bad guys that defeated the other bad guys. And of course, a lot of and people died and, and, you know, obviously the, the Russian people were fighting to defend their, their Homeland, but it also turns out in the Pacific, you know, I was taught like many American school children that the Adam bombs ended, uh, caused Japan to surrender. That's not true if you go back and look, the Soviets invaded uria on August 8th, 1945 in between the two bombs of OCIA and Hiro and Nagasaki and the Japanese, you remember, they wanted to keep Hato as their emperor. That was the, the main sticking point. They wanted to keep their emperor. They figured if you look in the records, if you, if you look in the records, the Japanese figured, wait a minute, the Russians, the Russians kill their emperor. Nick Nicholas, a second, 25 years ago. Gee, I wonder what they're gonna do to hear ATO. So that's why they surrender it. Wasn't the a atomic, well,
Speaker 2 00:27:20 Let's give Jason a chance to answer.
Speaker 4 00:27:23 Oh, okay. Thank you.
Speaker 2 00:27:24 Thank you.
Speaker 0 00:27:25 I'm not, well, I'm not sure what your dis given what I've talked about. I'm not sure I haven't talked about any, well, I disagree with your assessment of, of the Soviets winning the war in Japan, but I'm not sure what your, what the source of your disagreement really is. Um,
Speaker 4 00:27:40 We, we did, we didn't have to intervene. We did not have to intervene at all, nor did Britain. The war would've been just between the Soviet union and, and Nazi Germany. We should have had open immigration. Had we had open immigration, literally millions of people who ended up dying in the camps, would've been able to come to the United States. So it, it
Speaker 0 00:28:01 Declared war against us. So we had to, we had to intervene. I mean, Germany declared war against the us. So we had to, we had to enter the war
Speaker 4 00:28:10 Well, that was after Len lease and cash and Carrie and all the other programs in that two years leading up. And, and honestly, if you really look at it, the Japanese had three serious peace proposals in 1941. I mean, again, I, I
Speaker 2 00:28:23 Mean, this is going back 80 years. I, I mean, let's keep it on Russia a little bit.
Speaker 0 00:28:28 Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah.
Speaker 4 00:28:31 Well, again, just, just to wrap up, I mean, the point is it's like Russia, shouldn't be, we should not be an enemy of Russia.
Speaker 2 00:28:40 That's fair. Clark. Can we appreciate that? Ja, you're still coming out a little bit, uh, in the meantime, uh, we'll go to Irina. Thank you for joining us. Are you able to unmute yourself? Do you have a question for Jason? Um, all right, well, let's go to, uh, TAs founder, Dr. David Kelly. Uh, let's see if you have a que question and we'll come back to arena.
Speaker 6 00:29:14 Okay. Thanks, Scott. And thank you. Uh, Jason, um, I have a question, uh, the, about the, uh, liberal order, uh, the liberal order is a conceptual framework of laws, uh, expectations, agree agreements. It's a little more general than an actual Alliance, um, structured by treaties. Um, and so I I'd be interested in anything more you can say about what makes up the liberal order, um, and how it should be extended. That is why we are defending Ukraine against Russia, given a grand Russia's an enemy, but there are many, um, things that is done that we're not defending as like Georgia and elsewhere. Um, and there are many bad things that have in the world, uh, by authoritarian powers. And I mean, all lots of Western Africa, Somalia, uh, the, uh, east Asia, um, um, <inaudible> and, and other countries that we're not involved in, we just, we can sympathize with the victims of all these people, but we are not reaching out to them. So what is the, um, limiting principle of, uh, Jason of defending, um, or how far does the liberal order extend as a reason for us involvement in trying to increase the scope of, um, possible alliances or any rate bringing people within the liberal order system?
Speaker 0 00:31:04 Well, the, the I'll answer the second part first, we, we Somalia and those countries are not enemies of the United States of America. I mean, I don't, we, we, we, we, or we're not in a blatantly adversarial position with them as we certainly, I take it that we certainly are with Russia. Um, and it's not so much helping <affirmative>, it's not so much helping Ukraine as it is doing anything in our powers to defeat the Putin regime and to weaken as much as possible that regime and bring it to its knees and weaken it destroy the political configuration of the Putin regime. So it's, by any means, it's not by any means necessary. If, if, if Russia were in a war with France or Russia were in a war with Moldova, uh, I would say we would have the right to not it's. I, I don't see it so much as the way I frame does not so much helping Ukraine as it is using Ukraine as a means to defeat <affirmative> Russia.
Speaker 0 00:32:11 Um, now the internet, so it's, it's, it's less about defeating, cause I know you're gonna see this as an act of altruism. It's less about helping Ukraine as it is using Ukraine as a proxy by means a proxy to defeat and weaken and destabilize Russia who has done something quite egregious. And through that egregious act threatens the well the well, the civilizational nature of, of, of, of Europe in general. Um, as far as international world order, I mean, it's really meant to prevent the world from becoming an international Europe basically, or the world, if extend to the Pacific, um, to, from becoming an international jungle. Um, I mean, Atcherson said that, you know, with, with no, with no with no empire with no prizes for good boys in such a world weakness and indecision are fatal. Um, so without that kind of order to temper the impulses, the trigger impulses or the anarchical impulses, or the war impulses, the maniacal impulses of any would be rogue state, or any authoritative despotic leader or rogue state in the making, um, we need the liberal world order to keep those nations in check, uh, to keep them at bay and also to formulate an Alliance, to keep the Alliance among the, what I would call the nation of the union of moral states, civilized states to punish them and to find ways to ostracize, punish and, um, sanction them when they, um, violate the precepts and the norms that govern the international liberal world order.
Speaker 0 00:34:03 So, uh, it's, it's a regulative means of maintaining or preventing the world from resorting to AIAN state of nature. Uh, so the liberal, the liberal world order was less really about Soviet expansionism and more about preventing, um, the kind of wars that erupted the two wars that erupted world war I and world war II, um, that presented a grave threat to humanity in general, to, to world civilization. Um, people might differ in their interpretation. I don't know that the world order was when it was created because Stalin at that time was not what was not yet or enemy, um, had not become Russia had not at that time become really or enemy at that time. So it was less about Soviet expansionism and, and more about preventing the world for are becoming some kind of international jungle from preventing the kinds of destination that had been created by those two wars. Um, and I think that even more today where we have the rise of authoritarianism and despotism across the globe, that that sort of world order needs to be in place, um, given the manifest destinies of Iran, even the manifest Destin of China, which is quite nefarious and given the manifest destiny of Russia, um, well, we don't really have to call North Korea cuz that's sort of contained, but they do have nuclear weapons and they, you know, so that's, that's the answer I would give you David.
Speaker 6 00:35:45 Okay. Thanks. I, I, I wanted to, uh, I know one, um, take too much more of your time, but let me make sure I understand, uh, in saying that the, um, you know, the goal is defeating Russia, not so much, uh, defending Ukraine, defending Ukraine is a, is a means to that, to the end of, uh, uh, controlling Russia. Um, some people have argued that Ukraine could be a valuable, uh, it's a, it's a fairly civilized country. Um, it wants to join Western union, um, uh, the economic union as well as NATO. The economic union is a relevant factor here. Uh, So that the, the positive argument for our involvement in Ukraine is, um, that Ukraine could be a valuable member. It could be a great trading partner. It could be part of a security Alliance, uh, defensive one, uh, as you said, it was, but I, you seem to be downplaying that. And I, I just wonder if you give any credibility to the, to the positive argument of let's protect your Ukraine as a possible, uh, member of a, uh, an American lead, um, uh, you know, free pre free world Alliance or, uh, union of moral nations.
Speaker 0 00:37:18 Yes, I would give credence to that argument. I would, I would certainly give credence to it, but my, my emphasis here is that Russia has to clear war on us. It is our enemy, it is our adversary and we have to use whatever means we can. So the, the, the accent for me falls more heavily on defeating, weakening, totally weakening and crippling Russia. Uh, and if we can use a proxy means to do it, um, then should do it, but I wouldn't undermine, uh, you know, bringing into the Pantheon of the union of civilized states or into the, the domain of, of the European union, um, a country like Ukraine, which we can, you know, um, what's the word I'm trying to use. I don't want to use a condescending word, but we, we can have a civilizing effect on some of these former, um, Soviet states that have been reified for a long, long time and, and, and bring them within the Pantheon of, of, of, or the crucibles of, of, of, of civilization Mors that is, you know, respect for property rights, freedom of speech, um, freedom of religious association, everything that's associated with all with political liberalism in the, in the, in the 16th, 17th century center sense of liberalism.
Speaker 0 00:38:38 Um, yeah, so I, yeah, you and I wouldn't disagree on that at all. I, I, I do think that that, that is a position I would defend. It's just that my first line fence would be Russia is our enemy, and we should use the, this as an opportunity first and foremost, to defeat Russia in whatever way we can.
Speaker 1 00:39:05 All right. Uh, bill, thank you. Thank you. Thank you for your patience. Hopefully you guys can hear me better now,
Speaker 8 00:39:12 Much better. Um, when you say by enemies necessary, I have noticed, uh, at the, uh, world order has not, for example, used assassination as a tool against, um, various enemies. We seem a whole lot of things would happen in our favor if Putin was simply dead. Um, I personally regard that as a moral and least effort answer, if it's doable at all, that is, uh, but what's your opinion?
Speaker 0 00:39:42 Well, I think it was president Ford, wasn't it who sort of did away with the notion of extra legal assassination by executive order. If I missed, if anybody on the stage, uh, can correct me if I'm wrong, but I think was under the presidency of, of Gerald Ford. Um, uh, I certainly think that, that in the old days a CIA would, would, would, you know, knock off the bad guys. Um, that's a, that's a question for national intelligence. I'm not gonna answer that. I mean, I, I,
Speaker 8 00:40:14 I certainly, I meant that as a moral question, not as a practical question.
Speaker 0 00:40:18 Well, certainly as a moral question, it would be correct. It, there, there would be Putin just like Hitler, just like Stalin, um, who kill 32 Klux, um, have, have forfeited their, their rights, um, certain rights that they have. So as a moreish, I would have no problem with it at all. Now, as of sort of, is it strategically inner self-interest to make it be publicly known that the United States of America is engaging in extra legal assassinations? You know, that's a different, that's something that should be never be made, ever be made public at all, but from a moral perspective, yeah. I would have no moral problems with that at all. Known.
Speaker 8 00:41:01 I, I would, uh, uh, observe that as we are at war with Russia, perhaps it would be a good point. Um, you declare war on us and while we go after you personally seems a, a perfectly good, um, public strategy, um, anyway, but, uh, that gets a field into strategy, which is really not the point here. So I'll shut up at this point next.
Speaker 1 00:41:25 Thank you, bill. Rob would love your thoughts, um, discussion to see if, uh, if we've got it right.
Speaker 9 00:41:39 Can you hear me?
Speaker 0 00:41:40 Yeah,
Speaker 9 00:41:44 I, that, if I can, uh, bring up something here, there was a phrase you used early on here that I, I think needs to be expanded on, or it could, would be helpful to be expanded upon. And that phrase is great and strategy. And I think it's like, I view it as sort of a crucial sort of middle step between political philosophy and foreign policy, the ISET of grand strategy. And it, it is really contrast to the way a lot of people approach foreign policy, which is it's very ad hoc and reactive and, oh, here's a crisis. What do I think about that? Or, well, often what do I feel about it? Whereas think people need to think more in terms of grand strategy. So, so if you could talk about that a little bit more. Can anybody hear me?
Speaker 0 00:42:30 Yeah. I, sorry. I'm sorry. I muted. I'm sorry. I muted. Oh,
Speaker 9 00:42:33 That's okay. I got cut off one. So I'm
Speaker 11 00:42:36 One of these. So I always wonder if I'm gonna get cut off again.
Speaker 0 00:42:40 So I'm talking about grant strategy in the, in the, in the way that political scientists talk about it in the sense of a comprehensive well integrated, um, philosophy, not in philosophy, but just a well integrated and comprehensive method of dealing with foreign policy. Um, that is not ad hoc. That is not arbitrary. That is not based solely on necessarily political expediency, but is founded in certain basic fundamental principles that do speak to a countries, basic self interest broadly construed, um, or it may not. I mean, there, there have been grant strategies that people have argued are not, are anemical to America's self interest. The fact is, is that like any kind of strategy, it's something that is predictable. It's something that, uh, will yield certain consequences that one can ostensibly point to, um, is something that we can, um, shore up as both expedient. And in some sense, it has a moral upshot to it, an ethical upshot to it.
Speaker 0 00:43:51 Um, so when political theorists talk about grant strategy in that way, they're talking about a very unified, uh, comprehensive at the policies or doctrines that inform, uh, nations foreign policy, um, that is used in a way that is non arbitrary. Um, as you said, it's is a, it's an, a non ad hoc sort of sort of manner. Um, and, and it sort of defines the, the vision or how can I put it, not just the vision, but it defines the, um, it defines the tenor and the outlook of, um, a, a nation's view of itself in the world in relation to the world. So grant strategy among other things, I'm thinking, you know, I, when people like Kagan write about grant strategy or, um, um, yeah, I'm thinking about his return of history. It's, it's, it, it, it definitely speaks to the way in which a country views itself in relation to other nations and its place in the world, and thinking you also hear of a book that I use quite frequently for my book, which is called American power and liberal order, a conservative international grant strategy by Paul D. Miller.
Speaker 0 00:45:29 It's, it's interesting that you asked me about that question, Rob, cuz that book is always on my desk. Um, so when he talks about grant strategy, you know, he's talking about, uh, a method by which we can also use to a method of analysis, a method, a methodology by which we can make sense of foreign policy. Um, so it's, it's also prescriptive, right? A grant strategy is also prescriptive. So, um, it there's a normative dimension to it. It, it tells us how we ought to act in the world. Um, analysis from grant strategy also gives us options for seeing other nations, um, the way other nations behave in relation to other nations with other nations, it gives us a strategy. It gives us a methodology for, or a manner of, of balancing the way, um, nations behave towards other nations. So I would say that the liberal inter world war, it was a sort of, um, it, it, it, it, it, it was a part of us grant strategy mm-hmm <affirmative>, but it wasn't, it wasn't, it wasn't solely, um, the grant strategy of, of the United States. It was shared by other, by our allies. If that, if that helps.
Speaker 9 00:46:58 Yeah. I, I just, I I've been Chris stating for the idea that in, in addition to the merits of one granted strategy for another, the fact that we should actually, my main view on grant strategy is we should have one <laugh> because I think most parties. And I think we haven't really had one since the end of the cold war Bush tried to create one during the Iraq war. The forward strategy of freedom was his grants strategy. It didn't take, but we haven't had a really, you know, during the cold war, the grant strategy was the prime. I would say the grant strategy was containment. It was the idea that we are in a, we're in a contest with Soviet union, but our main goal is going to be to contain them and keep them from expanding, uh, while we strengthen and, and grow the free nations.
Speaker 0 00:47:41 Right. And that was something like,
Speaker 0 00:47:43 Go ahead. Yeah, yeah. Or something like realism versus idealism, broadly speaking could be, oh, way of framing, a grant strategy, assuming that the country adheres to those policies. So you saw where under, under Bush or, or quote unquote little meta grant strategy changed right after nine one. One where we got into this notion of we were not the world's 9 1, 1 police into this notion of nation building. So I don't, if I agree with, with you that we didn't have a, I, I think we didn't have a grant strategy until 9 1 1 when Bush tried to develop a new grant strategy, which involved a shift from realism into idealism, uh, and that idealism involved among other things, nation building and spreading democracy and making the world safer democracy, like a will Sonia and grant strategy, right. Something like that.
Speaker 2 00:48:35 Well, uh, I, I do wanna try to, uh, squeeze Roger in with the time we have left. Thank you, Rob. Appreciate that, Roger.
Speaker 12 00:48:46 Yeah. Hey, uh, thanks for having me. No, I, I love getting on this topic, especially with, with, uh, the diversity of thought within the Atlas society on Russia. Uh, my question is more about how do we avoid becoming Russia ourself. And what I mean specifically is there seems to be people that wanna pull us in a more authoritarian direction. And those people we've called them out for a long time on the left, but there's people on the right that also want to do this. And my question is how do we avoid, uh, authoritarianism, uh, coming from either direction? Uh, like, like what's, what's the, uh, the sound footing that we could latch onto that would, uh, that would help us avoid going off that cliff.
Speaker 0 00:49:36 I don't know. We have a constitution don't we? And we, we, we, we have a additional branch of government and we have a constitution. And I think sometimes I would think there, but for the grace of our constitution go, we, but, um, if that's grammatic, that's not a grammatical in Felicity, I don't know, go the rest of us or something like that. But, um, I think that the basic answer is that we have a constitution and we have three, three branches of government, and there are restrictions on, um, the kinds of actions that a single individual can take. Um, or there, there are just ways in which there are just ways in which our constitution is, is, is, is configured that something like an oligarchy would be inconceivable, um, in this country. So I think our constitution is our best protection. Um, I see authoritarian impulses on the left and on the right, but not in the way that there's, there is no analogous, um, descriptor here that is that one could extensively point to someone in us politics and say, Putin is the, or one could point to Putin and say, that's the American analog Putinism is like the Russian analog of, of, of a, of an, a authoritarian figure in America.
Speaker 0 00:51:04 I mean, we have a constitution that protects us against all the kinds of transgressions that you see happening in Russia. Um, for example, Putin has just certain powers that allow him to make it possible for him to remain in an office until if you can call what he occupies an office, but remain in power until 2036, um, or constitution just doesn't function that way in the way that we sort of can give one person that kind of central power to, to coalesce power and, and to, um, single handedly maneuver and navigate oneself in the political realm in such a way that one would harness that much power over an extended period of time. So I think we have this magnificent document called the constitution that prevents not people from having authoritarian impulses and in sometimes maybe using the privilege of executive orders to behave in an authoritative way, but then there's, you know, the Vita powers that we have from, from, uh, certain restraints that Congress can actually exercise to keep those, those executive, um, powers and check.
Speaker 0 00:52:13 And what I mean by that is, uh, there's certain executive powers that a president might execute. And then we have an election, we automotive power and then a new president comes in and completely overturned, uh, that, which the previous president had executed. We saw that happening, president Trump, who he just overturned a lot of, um, mandates that president Obama had had issued by executive order. So we have, we have a document, Roger, I think that prevents I in my eyes, people might disagree, but I think we have this magnificent document and that the way our, or, or the three branch just of our government are configured, that would prevent something like that from happening. I just, I just can't see it happening. I see it happening culturally, but not politically.
Speaker 12 00:53:04 I hope you're right. Appreciate it.
Speaker 0 00:53:06 Yeah.
Speaker 13 00:53:09 Thank you. Roger Al.
Speaker 14 00:53:16 Yeah. Hi. Uh, so, um, Jason, as you've said, um, that the United States is using the Ukraine as a proxy. If that's the correct term, I don't wanna misrepresent what you said, but it's using Ukraine as a proxy in order to, to, um, weaken and overthrow Russia. Um, what's, you know, it seems to me, I can remember back to first, um, you know, during Jimmy Carter's presidency and then the, uh, the, the outrage from the, uh, or, or are the opposition. I don't want to use outrage the opposition from the left to the us involvement in south America, and then the opposition again, from the left for our involvement in Kuwait and Afghanistan and Iraq.
Speaker 14 00:54:27 And we leave the United States under Biden, says, okay, we've been there long enough, we're leaving. And now we're involved in a, yet another war. And the justification being that we need to oppose this mortal enemy to the United States, and that we need to oppose this, this dictator, but it seems to me morally, we're using the Ukraine, Ukrainian people, and they're the ones paying the price, not us. Um, and that the, the, the way the media has portrayed Putin, I think is a gross misrepresentation of him. Uh, one of the ways in one case, I mean, I th his approval rating, despite what Western media says still remains somewhere in the mid seventies. All right. Well, so I just, I I'm, I'm wondering about the moral implication of this and what I Rand would see about it, because it seems to me contrary, as I think David said, or Clark said, this would be contrary to her position.
Speaker 0 00:55:53 I heard somebody said they wanted to, they wanted to chip
Speaker 13 00:55:55 Thing. We
Speaker 0 00:55:57 Wanna chip in
Speaker 2 00:56:00 Jack. I think you're fading again. Uh, Jason, do you want to go ahead and do a quick answer to that question, uh, before we wrap up?
Speaker 0 00:56:09 Yeah, I, well, I, I, I did say that we were fighting a war by proxy. I was, this is a response to David's question. I said that we would have the right, and we should, if we can use the U Ukraine to fight a war by proxy, because Russia has already declared war on us. And it's just not probably politically expedient for the United States to say, you know, Russia has declared war on us. So we're going to, we're gonna, we're gonna fight a war with Russia. That's, it's just, just for diplomatic for all sorts of reasons. Um, so I don't know that that's exactly what the intent of the us government is. I think it ought to be, uh, we are certainly helping the Ukrainians defeat Russia as morally, and it's in our meta case where I think it's in our self interest to weaken Russia.
Speaker 0 00:57:00 Uh, but, but you said something about Russia being misrepresented, Putin, being misrepresented. I disagree with that emphatically. I think Putin has made his case very, very clearly. I think it's not just the us media, it's the world media, uh, depicted him in all of his ugliness and his criminality. And yes, he has a lot of popularity in Russia because, and I made this last week, this point last week that the Russian people should pay because they are as nationalistic and as culturally nationalistic as he is, there was a poll that was done by a Russian journalist, uh, if one can trust such polls, but she can about, and she said that they are most of them after the invasion, his ratings went up because they're just as nationalistic and culturally nationalistic, and they wanted the invasion before the sanction started to hit. Right. So the idea that he's, I don't know where this idea that Putin is misrepresented and that he's some sort of nice guy and that, and that I, I don't know where the misrepresentation is coming from.
Speaker 0 00:58:09 There have been all sorts of reports about his behavior and how he, he functions as a death spot and an authoritarian figure. Um, I, I'm just not I'm, I'm just not buying that at all. I, I, I I'm, I'm flabbergasted I'm ox actually that I would see Putin as anything other than he himself has portrayed himself to literally be. And the Mo the, the, the, the multiplicity of reports that have come out about how he treats his opponents, how he runs the country, um, Al Jer Al Jazeer to BBC, to all, all sorts of reports, we have, I think, a pretty unbiased and very fair, accurate representation of Putin and how he runs his country and how he deals more specifically with his opponent. So, um, yeah.
Speaker 2 00:59:06 Well, great. I mean, we could say a lot more. Good ahead, Jack.
Speaker 1 00:59:10 No, <laugh> just Scott. Thank you for being my, my wingman with, uh, all of the connectivity problems, um, I've had today. And I just wanted to thank, um, professor Jason Hill. Thank our founder, David Kelly. Uh, thank Robens. Thank, uh, Roger, um, as always, and thank all of you for all of the great questions, um, encourage you to sign up for updates with the ATLA society. So you'll get email notifications on our upcoming clubhouse sessions. We have one coming up on Tuesday with Bobinski on why we never learn anything from economics, and then Wednesday, uh, with professor Steven Hicks. Um, and ask me anything. So, um, thank you everyone. And, uh, look forward to seeing you next week.
