Was Nietzsche Pro-Slavery? with Stephen Hicks

[00:00:00] Speaker A: Good. [00:00:00] Speaker B: Well, it is the bottom of the hour. We're going to go ahead and get started. Thanks, everyone, for being here today. I'm Scott Schiff with the Atlas Society, and we're very pleased to have Atlas society senior scholar Stephen Hicks discussing. Was Nietzsche pro slavery? After Professor Hicks opening remarks, we'll take questions from you. So if you want to request to speak, we'll try to get to as many of you as possible. Stephen, thanks so much for doing this topic. [00:00:29] Speaker A: Always a pleasure and thanks for hosting, Scott. So I want to jump in with some questions on my mind. The overarching question is whether Nietzsche was pro slavery. I don't think it's much of a plot spoiler to say that yes, he was, and quite vehemently so. There are some surrounding questions that make this an important topic for me is just the stature of Nietzsche on 20th and 21st century intellectual life is astounding. I've made the claim that he is the most influential intellectual of the last 124 years now, and that's arguable. But I think the argument can be won. And yet he is strongly illiberal and nonetheless attractive to many people who think of themselves as lovers of freedom and individualism and so on. So there is some cognitive dissonance there that needs to be sorted out. Also on my mind is, while Nietzsche often has a reputation for being an individualist, for being an egoist, how is that fit with his forthright advocacy of slavery? And does it perhaps point to that? It might be a superficial reading to see him as being much of an individualist or much of an egoist. This is the Atlas society hosting this. And so one of the other questions kicking around in my mind is that Nietzsche is often associated with Ayn Rand in, again, sometimes popular readings of Nietzsche. And many times you will just see people, just in a facile way, identifying the views of the two or saying that basically their views are the same. But while Nietzsche was a real philosopher, deep Rand is simply a pop philosopher or something less than that. What is the actual relationship between Nietzsche and Rand and their contrasting views on slavery? Again, I think is a strong clue that maybe that facile identification of the two needs to be, to be rethought. Also kicking around is just the last few years on social media and in intellectual life more generally, there's been a significant interest in the question of historical slavery and re examining the record of slavery, sorting out who gets blamed for it, who gets credit for bringing about the end of it. Should we put reparations on the table? And some legislatures are, in fact, doing so. So the historical record of slavery and the stain of slavery is still with us, significantly so, going back to the giant philosophers and the most influential philosophers, like Nietzsche, and knowing what they've had to say about slavery is also relevant. Another question is partly a historical question about how ideas change cultures and the speed with which those things can happen. So one of the striking things is that societies for the abolition of slavery did not come into the existence until the 17 hundreds. They were a fruit of the enlightenment, the first ones coming into existence in the 1780s. But by the time we ever then, at the end of the 17 hundreds, you have significant movements of just regular non intellectual career people, but many intellectuals and politicians and others doing something about slavery. And that picks up steam over as we get into the 18 hundreds. But it's still striking that otherwise, people you know to be highly intelligent and highly influential are either resisting or outright opposed to the abolition of slavery movements, even as we far get into the 18 hundreds. And Friedrich Nietzsche is one of those individuals. So how is it possible that someone in the latter part of the 18 hundreds after abolition has been on the table for well over a century at that point, is still resisting abolition and saying dismissive things about that? So those are questions we won't be able to get to all of them, but they form the motivational context for my approach, approaching this issue now. Nietzsche's context, more specifically. He started publishing in the early 1870s. His first great book, and it really is a great book, was published in 1872, the Birth of tragedy. And the subtitle, a very interesting subtitle, is out of the spirit of music. And he is an expert in classical culture, classical languages, classical ideas. And he's focusing on how the Greeks very quickly elevated the art of tragedy to such high levels in aeschylusophicles, euripides, others. And he has a theory about why the Greeks did it, why the tragic sense of life and the tragic form of theater resonated with them, why they were able to do it so deeply, what connections the theatrical versions of tragedy do and epic poetry that is tragic in common has to do with music, and the deep connections between different artistic media, and what all of this can still, in the 18 hundreds, teach us about the deep philosophical questions, including the questions of the meaning of life. So this is Nietzsche in full flower of intellectual maturity, starting in 1872. Now, at that time, it's worth, if we think about the slavery context, to say that this was just a few years, seven years after the end of the US civil war. War. And everybody was aware of the existence of the civil war, that it had largely been fought over slavery. Also in the early 1860s, Russia, still backward in many respects, but it had abolished serfdom. There were many international treaties initiated by the european nations, but with significant sign ons by many other nations limiting the slave trade, promising to make steps toward abolishing slavery around the world. The british nation navy had, for now, a couple of generations, been engaging in very expensive, manpower intensive patrols all up and down the Atlantic and then over in the Indian Ocean trying to disrupt the slave trade. And there were just many intellectuals, british, american, french, including some enlightened german intellectuals like Alexander Humboldt, who were appalled by slavery and devoted argumentation and effort toward the elimination of slavery. And so these pro liberty, more broadly pro liberal, pro reason, pro individual rights ideas that have come out of the enlightenment were also in full flower and being extraordinarily influential. And so what is striking then, is bursting onto the intellectual scene in the 1870s and then even more so in the 1880s. Friedrich Nietzsche is having none of it. You know, he's anti liberal in a fundamental way. He's anti reason, he's anti sort, certainly individual rights. He's pro slavery. So where does all of this come from? And what kind of a case does he. Does he make? Now, I want to mention there's some discussion among scholars about Nietzsche evolving, and it's true to say that on some of his views, he did change. You can identify an early Nietzsche, a mid phase Nietzsche, and then a late Nietzsche. But I also want to trace his thinking on the issue of slavery, in particular, going back to the. The time of his first publication. Now, I mentioned the birth of tragedy. He had originally written another chapter that came to be separately separated from the book called the Greek state. And you can read it. It's online in various sources and is often included in anthologies of Nietzsche's work. So the birth of tragedy is focusing on art and philosophy and doing a lot of the history of culture and the connections between the two of those. But he had this additional chapter called the greek state that kind of at the last minute before he published birth of tragedy, he cut it because it was too political, and he wanted to keep the focus of birth of tragedy just on the aesthetics and the philosophy. So he planned to repackage it with a later work. But the issue of slavery is front and center in the greek state. So this is now early Nietzsche. He would be. When he wrote it, he would have been 26 years old, 27 years old. And the question he's taking up is what basically is the meaning of life. And what can we still learn from the Greeks about the meaning of life? Nietzsche has a tragic sense of the meaning of life, that life is ultimately meaningless. There is no God to give meaning to life. That's an illusion that weak minded people put upon themselves to try to distract themselves from the often brutal and tragic nature of life in itself. In the natural world, we invent fantasy realities, and sometimes we actually believe that there are gods and heavens and so forth. And then we invest what is an intrinsically meaningless life with this fantasy that there is some meaning beyond the grave. And certainly part of Nietzsche's philosophy is that death of God theme. And realistically, and then with courageous facing what the meaning of life is going to be if there is no such traditional religious answer to the question. But then he goes through all of the other things that we distract ourselves with. We plunge ourselves into work, and we try to say, well, maybe if I pile up enough money, I can find some meaning of life. But Nietzsche agrees with the Greeks and the long tradition that work. There is something menial about work that's not accidental, that the higher people in the clergy, who dedicated themselves to higher things, basically outsourced all of the work to the peasants and the slaves and lived off of their efforts. The aristocrats did the same thing. They tried to dedicate themselves to higher things. And menial labor was seen as something that the peasants and the slaves and the so forth do. There is no inherent dignity now in the modern world. Nietzsche says, we're trying to rehabilitate the idea of, but it's a fraud. And ultimately, if you just are going to be a shopkeeper or a farmer or whatever, that's not ultimately going to be a meaningful, a meaningful life. We might say we're going to live through our children, but then all we're doing is deferring the question of meaning of life to our children. What's the point of our children's lives if it says they're going to be shopkeepers and farmers? Then again, it's a, it's a meaninglessness. So ultimately, life is brutal. There's a lot of conflict. There's a lot of exploitation, there's a lot of betrayal. Ultimately, our bodies betray us and we die. But very few people have the courage to face that squarely. And said they invent various sorts of illusions. Now, Nietzsche then, is forthrightly saying that art is an illusion, but it's the only kind of illusion that can seriously get one through life. And it's the kind of illusion that only high quality people can both create the kind of people who can create significant art that can transport us, the music, the theater, the literature, and so forth. But then also to be the kind of person who can be transported by that kind of music takes an elevated person, and it's only a tiny minority of people who are really going to be able to do so. So the only realistic possibility of anything redeeming the tragic nature of life is art. And so Nietzsche wants to argue in the greek state, that the Greeks had a glimmer of this, and that was partly why they had no problem with slavery and trying to free up the higher quality people who could become the artists and do the elevated things. And we find some of this among the Romans, some of this among some of the more honest christians, who made no bones about their enjoying their high lifestyle at the expense of the peasants and the slaves and so forth, the higher types in the Renaissance, who would elevate themselves and pursue an aesthetic life. And then Nietzsche wants to carry on this, to carry on this tradition. But this is where the point of slavery comes in, because he says, quite forthrightly, in order for the higher type of people to have the leisure and the freedom to be able to develop themselves in this aesthetic way, they can't be working for a living. They really have to be able to immerse themselves in an aesthetic life. And that means that there has to be a large number of people who are going to work to produce the stuff that those people are going to need. And Nietzsche goes on, quite forthrightly, at least the early Nietzsche, to say there's no problem. Problem, then, with the state being quite authoritarian and relegating slaves and serfs to the role of producing the goods that the state is going to confiscate and then rededicate to the people who have the potential. And their potential is identified when they are younger, so that they can live a certain kind of lifestyle. And then out of even that small minority of people who are able to live that kind of lifestyle, the one in a million. And genius will emerge, and that will be the genius who redeems that generation and takes humanity further. So I'll give you a quotation here where Nietzsche is saying quite forth, rightly, that slavery is absolutely, absolutely essential. Here. Just give me one moment here. Sorry, I need to clear my throat. [00:16:07] Speaker B: Go ahead, take a moment. I've got already some questions. I'm jotting down as you're speaking, so I'll look forward to getting into those once. Once you're done, take more time if you need it. Grab some water. You know, I'm curious if he was more for slavery because there weren't enough labor saving devices or if he wanted there to be kind of, you know, different classes of only certain people appreciating high art. [00:16:51] Speaker A: Yeah. [00:16:55] Speaker B: We can save that for after. [00:17:00] Speaker A: Okay, I'm back again. I think I'm good to go, so I want to jump. Just also noticing the time here to mid state Nietzsche. So Nietzsche, then it would be 14 years later and is possibly most famous work beyond good and evil, reiterating these same sorts of themes. Now there he's developing his notion of slave morality and master morality, that biologically and psychologically, human beings are along a spectrum. A large number of people don't have what it takes actually to put together a meaningful, significant life. They have a slave psychology. They are weak, and they develop a morality that tells them that they're the good guys and they follow the herd, and they try to have a nice, comfortable life. And again, there are those who are special individuals who have a master type of psychology. They know what they want to pursue, and they make no bones about pursuing it by basically any means that they can. Nietzsche is starting to be a little more skeptical about the role of the state in fostering this and the legitimacy of the state in doing so. He does not, of course, become a liberal. He continues to say that he's not liberal by any means, but he does recognize that the state is often perverted into all sorts of. Of strange ends, ones that do not foster the development of the higher sort of man as he sees it. But by the time we get to the book, beyond good and evil, this is now Nietzsche in the middle 1880s. He's still quite forthright in arguing for slavery. So, for example, in section 190, you can check this if you wanted, beyond good and evil, Nietzsche says, and it's a direct quote. Slavery is, as it seems, both in the cruder and in the more subtle sense, the indispensable means of spiritual discipline and cultivation, too. And then a little bit later, he says, every enhancement of the type man so far has been the work of an aristocratic society, and it will be so again and again. A society that believes in the long order of rank and difference in value between man and man and that needs slavery in some sense or other. Now, what's interesting here is that he's still quite forthright in saying that slavery, in the cruder sense, by which he means physical slavery, actual slaves, is still going is still necessary to society. And he believes that many people, because of their, their. Their physical capacities, their moral capacities, their intellectual capacities, are really best suited for that lifestyle. So they might as well be used for that purpose anyway. But there is a slight evolution here in that Nietzsche has more forthrightly dwelled upon the judeo christian tradition and the long ascetic tradition within Christianity. So he says, it's not only the cruder forms of slavery, but the spiritual forms of slavery that are also now important. You don't find that in the earlier Nietzsche. So what he has in mind here is to the extent that he is nonetheless a great critic of the judeo christian tradition. One thing that he does recognize is that he has taken it, rather, has taken what ordinarily would be all kinds of human energy directed in external form, athletic pursuits, martial pursuits, physical adventuring, and so forth, and directed it inward. And that the Jews and the Christians, who have pursued a very disciplined, monastic, ascetic kind of lifestyle, have gone to war with themselves and imposed on themselves a kind of slavery. They take a vow of obedience, they take a vow of poverty, they take a vow of chastity, and so forth. And while that is, in one sense, coming out of a slave morality tradition, nonetheless, there have been some christian monks, and we see there are eastern analogues of this as well, who are nonetheless mastering themselves in the service. They're using a slave type of morality to master their own spirit and to teach themselves how to become more powerful in the spiritual direction rather than in the material direction. And so he starts to be a little more open to the idea that if we are interested in improving the human condition, it will be some human beings who will be the master type, and they will be master artists, master artist types, and some of them will be be master military types, we think of Napoleon and so forth. But some of them maybe will be master spiritual types. And maybe there will be a synthesis of these types. So we'll have the types who will impose slavery on military troops, some who will impose slavery on people who are producing the physical goods, and some people who will impose slavery or a kind of slavery on themselves, they will undertake, take that internal slave like state in order to develop their spirituality to a higher level. And if we can find a human being who will integrate all of those, that will be a development of a higher type of people. So that's interesting. And that is something that he starts to explore more further, rather, in his later works. And I want to just give a couple of lines from the will to power a work which I think legitimately is part of Nietzsche's canon. But he had not officially published it at the time. He became dysfunctional in around 1890 or so. He had written everything, but he was trying different ways of organizing the manuscript. And then, before he lost use of his faculties, he never pulled the trigger and had it published. But when we read through will to power, we still find the theme that physical slavery is fine, political slavery is fine, and that there still is necessary the strongly hierarchical ordering of society to free those special individuals who are going to be able to take human beings up to the. Up to the higher level. So here's a quotation, for example, will to power, section 464, that he's still seeking, as he puts it, quote, a noble mode of thought that believes in slavery and in many degrees of subjection, as the presupposition of every higher culture. And that the big question is to what extent a sacrifice of freedom, even enslavement itself, gives the basis for bringing forth the higher type also in this world. Nietzsche shows explicit awareness of the various abolition movements that had started a century before and were quite prominent in various centers in Europe and so forth. But he has nothing but disdain for abolitionism, of slavery as a movement. He sees it as a sign of decadence, this notion that somehow we're trying to treat all human beings equally, or that we should be liberals and liberate everybody. He thinks both of those are completely stupid ideas and just wrong in their account of human nature. He reiterates that he is not a liberal by any stretch of the imagination. He's opposed to socialist equality. He's opposed to democracy. And so he thinks any intersection of those ideas that puts one in the camp of favoring the abolition of slavery. One is a decadent. And just arguing for policies that are going to. To ultimately keep human beings stagnant and prevent what is necessary for that higher aristocratic type to develop humanity to whatever the overman or superman or next stage of evolution is. So let me pause there. I've got some of those earlier questions we can come back to, and I've got some thoughts on those. But I wanted to just put it out, at least initially, that Nietzsche is consistently and forthrightly opposed to abolition and in favor of slavery in pretty much every possible form as an essential part of society's evolution to its next stage. So let's go to some questions. [00:26:20] Speaker B: Great. And I encourage people to raise your hand if you want to get in on this. I've got some questions myself. So, you know, he's writing in the 1870s, 1880s as slavery and serfdom as ending. I mean, does he see that as, like, causing society to fall apart or there's not enough room for artists anymore because of the rise of capitalism? [00:26:45] Speaker A: Yes, for sure. He thinks that by the time we get to the 18 hundreds, the western tradition is in its decadent phase and he doesn't see significant signs that it can improve. So from his perspective, he thought there was, you know, a glimmer of hope in a figure like Napoleon, but Napoleon had been defeated by 1815 and then by, you know, Nietzsche is born almost 30 years later and there's no significant figure coming along. Maybe Bismarck, but Bismarck is also a mixed figure from his, from his viewpoint. And he's, he's quickly disappointed in Bismarck musically. Maybe someone like Richard Wagner. He thought Wagner's early music was great and wonderful, but then he thinks Wagner has a crisis of faith and basically sells his soul to Christianity in his later work. So he breaks with, with Wagner. So when he's surveying the scene, the major movements of the 18 hundreds, he sees there's a strong religious revivalism. So Christianity had been suffering many blows and it seemed like it was being slowly laughed out of intellectual and broader culture as a result of the enlightenment. But it made a strong comeback in pretty fundamentalist forms in the early 18 hundreds. And Nietzsche is disgusted by that. He sees the rise of socialism in various forms and communism, you know, preaching the equality of man and pretending that eventually there's not going to be any more exploiter types and everybody will be nice to each other and share their toys. And Nietzsche, you know, just think that's just, that's, that's just a sheep's paradise. That's not a human, human development. He sees the rise of liberals and capitalists and the idea that, you know, for the liberals that everybody should be treated as a, as an individual with the same rights to freedom to pursue what they want. And Nietzsche thinks that's, that's terrible. You know, he thinks people are fit only for slavery. If you give them freedom, they won't know what to do with the freedom and they're just going to waste their lives and social society is going to not get the benefit of their, their coerced labor. The capitalists just want to trade with everybody. And, and I. There's strong prominence of the capitalist peace thesis among figures like Cobden and Bright and John Stuart Mill, that the nations that trade with each other don't go to war with each other. And so maybe we can put war behind us, but Nietzsche is entirely opposed to that because he thinks war is still absolutely essential. It's one of the few remaining social institutions that elevate human beings. That willingness to accept discipline all the way down, obedience all the way down, to impose discipline, to be willing to sacrifice yourself, to sacrifice lots and lots of people for some victory, for some cause. And he still sees war as one of the very few things that can mobilize millions and millions of people in the right direction and bring about some sort of collective progress toward the future vision, the capitalist peace thesis, and the idea that we're all going to become traders and work in factories and so forth and industrial farming and industrial production. Atheists who thinks that's a disgusting lifestyle. So he's entirely opposed to it. So, stepping back, if you say those are the top five or six movements in the middle part of the 18 hundreds, then he's. He's quite pessimistic. So the idea that there are some people who are forthrightly proud and willing to be master types and unapologetic, that they have an agenda, and that they're willing to basically use other people and walk over corpses if necessary to get to where they want to go, to resist that herd mentality, all of the pressures to conform, to be a nice guy, he doesn't see any sign of that. And so he sees himself basically as a lonely voice in the crowd. And maybe through his writings, he will strike a chord in some future individuals who have some potential central. [00:31:52] Speaker B: Yeah, the Napoleon thing struck me as almost monarchist. I wonder if there's cross currents with, like, the great man theory of people like Thomas Carlyle or maybe even rand to some degree, with hero worship. [00:32:08] Speaker A: Yeah, the great man theory of history is there are several subversions. One is to say that if you want to talk about any significant thing that has occurred in history, one version of the great man theory says that it's disproportionately individuals who come up with the ideas, who have the willpower, who have, say, the intelligence. There's a strategic vision, the charisma or whatever, to mobilize large numbers of people. So in the scientific realm, for example, the artistic innovations and the great artworks are by single individuals, or the great inventions are by single individuals or the great monuments. Even if it takes a thousand individuals to do the labor of building it, placing the stones and so forth, it's nonetheless, it's the vision of one architect who makes it, or one engineer who has to, has to happen. So there's a disproportionate value added thesis. That's one great man theory of history. Now, there are other versions of the great man theory of history that want to say something more than that. That there are individuals who are the vehicle of historical forces. So if you think, for example, of religious great Mendez theories, that there will be, say, thousands of people who are followers of a religion, or millions of them, but God does not speak to all of them, and God does not use all of them. So that when God wants to get something done, he doesn't, so to speak, just spread his power through a million people to effect what he wants done. Instead, God will choose a single individual and fill him with power, or fill him with a certain vision and the charisma and the energy to make it happen. So it is an individual who then, in that religious tradition, who will take that religion to the next step. So the prophets and individuals like Moses and various other prophets and so forth, and or Jesus and Orlando, Muhammad, they have disproportionate importance to moving the religion forward. But it's not because they, as an individual, built themselves up and made it happen, but rather they are from that religion's tradition, seen as the vehicle through which God works. And then other versions of religion, we'll see religions as developing through mass movement, not through special individuals. Now, by the time we get to you mentioned Carlyle and his earlier contemporary Hegel, you start to see secularized forms of that great man theory, that there are larger historical forces at work. Maybe there is a God or divinity or providence of some sort behind them. But to a large extent, they start to become secularized so that there is a peace, right? Or there is a nationality, and it has a kind of historical dynamic energy and a direction. But again, from this perspective, it's not going to be the great masses of the people that will move that collective forward, say, in contrast to Marxism. Instead, each people or each nation is going to have certain special individuals who will rise up and they will have the vision, the energy and the charisma to mobilize the millions of people in order to move their nation forward. So that great man theory of history will single out individuals like Napoleon, who is then, so to speak, the vehicle through which the French become the world historical nation. Or someone back in time, like Alexander the Great, became the vehicle through which the greek people arose. Or Julius Caesar, for a short people, took Rome to its next stage and so forth. So, and then Thomas Carlyle has a variant thesis on that. So I think you're right, Scott. Then to say that Nietzsche is definitely in that tradition, it is a great man theory of history, and probably his clearest version of that is the other other work that's well known. Thus spake Zarathustra, which is partly a philosophical epic poem almost, or a piece of literature almost. And there Zarathustra is functioning as a kind of great man, or as a proto great man as well as a prophet. And his idea is to hopefully motivate the future great men who will take human beings to the next stage. [00:37:35] Speaker B: Great answer. I encourage others to chime in. If you want to participate, you can request to speak. In the meantime, I'm wondering if you can just expand a little bit on what you were saying about him being one of the most influential, maybe some examples of schools of thought he's influenced. [00:37:57] Speaker A: Yes, that's a great question. One of the things that's striking about Nietzsche is how wide ranging his influence was. So when you study, for example, Sigmund Freud, and you then do a point by point comparison of Freud's psychoanalytical theory with deep instincts welling up and human rationality being a kind of superficial tact on faculty to deeper unconscious powers and drives, that's very nietzschean, and it's quite clear that Freud was drawing on significant nietzschean currents. Freud was, of course, a great critic of the judeo christian tradition. But it's nonetheless fascinating how many prominent jewish intellectuals like Martin Buber were deeply drinking from the nietzschean. Well, or Leo Strauss, who was captivated and then was centrally at Nietzsche for several years of his. Of his life, during his formative intellectual years, both of them coming out of the jewish tradition, even though Nietzsche was a forthright atheist thinkers who are among the founders of existentialism, another hugely prominent mid 20th century and still significant movement, Martin Heidegger and Jean Paul Sartre, deeply influenced by their reading of Nietzsche and their reflection on the God is dead theme, for example. So you can't really understand nature. Sorry, the existentials without understanding nature. And typically, Nietzsche is included among the forefathers or founding fathers of existentialism as a movement in objectivism. There's a lively subdivide literature for those interested in Rand's intellectual evolution. Clearly, she was captivated by Nietzsche, reading him in her twenties and on into her thirties. At the same time, there's a clear intellectual break with Nietzsche in the 1930s that becomes even more pronounced by the time we get into, into the 1940s. I think it's also important to point out that the critical theorists Horkheimer and Marcuse and Adorno and others in that school will argue that while they are marxist politically, that Marx classically has problems, and so Marx needs to be supplemented. A significant number of them are saying that the proper thing is going to be to reintegrate, or sorry, rather to try to forge a synthesis of Marx with Nietzsche, or of Marx with Hegel. I'm sorry. Or Marx leaving Hegel aside for now, Marx with Freud. But to integrate Marx with Freud also means to integrate him with. With Nietzsche as well. So Frankfurt school, critical theory and so on, the various post moderns, Derrida's understanding of language and deconstruction theory, a significant amount of that he gets from Hegel. But again, behind Hegel, a reading of Nietzsche and Nietzsche's philosophical reflections on the nature of language, as in no way being reflective of an objective reality or an obstruct of abstraction on objective reality, but rather being a subjective imposition on reality. So the foundations of deconstruction have strong intellectual antecedents in the nietzschean theory of language and the nietzschean epistemology more broadly. Another one, this is almost a direct quotation, would be Michel Foucault, probably the most famous and influential of all of the postmoderns. At points when he's reflecting on his own intellectual influences, he will say Heidegger was very important to his intellectual development, meant that he wished he had read critical school and Frankfurt school people earlier deeply read in Freud. But he says quite forthrightly, at one point, he says, this is almost a direct quote. I am simply a nietzschean, and my project is to read texts and other works, being as faithful to Nietzsche as is possible. So that, I think, is a pretty comprehensive list of some major 20th century movements, and a big part of the reason why I think Nietzsche is the most influential philosopher on 20th century intellectual life. [00:43:03] Speaker B: That could be an episode itself. [00:43:06] Speaker A: Yeah. [00:43:09] Speaker B: Well, so can we make a differentiation that, not that there are different human natures, but that there are different personality traits in people? [00:43:23] Speaker A: Yeah, I think personality is too superficial. I don't want to put words in your mouth here, but I think by personality, if we mean things like your sense of humor, how quick you are to react, whether you have a hair trigger or nothing, whether you are naturally quieter and more introspective or more, you know, gung ho life of the party type. So things, I think Nietzsche would be open to say that much of your personality, those elements of your psychology, are biologically rooted as well. But I think it goes deeper for him. So even if you go down to issues of character, to issues of intelligence to the entirety of human psychology, including personality, as in the mix. Nietzsche is a very strong determinist that all of those psychological things are really manifestations of underlying biological states. I think it would be more fair to say that it's something like saying, and this is not going to be a perfect analogy, but if you take dogs as dogs have been bred, that dogs now, there's a difference, stereotypically, say, between a pit bull and a golden retriever, where the pit bulls are bred to fight and the breeding to fight is built into them. So their personality is going to be a part of what it is to be a pit bull, but also the character of the pit bull, the intelligence of a pit bull, all of it is biologically rooted. And that contrasts, then, say, to the personality, including the intelligence level of the character of a golden retriever, which has been bred to be a basically a big sweetie, family play kind of dog. And the reason you can't really take a golden retriever and train it to be a vicious, you know, predatory dog is going to be the same reason why you can't really, with full trust. I don't know if this is true. I'm just going by the stereotype, take a pit bull and train it to be a non predatory big sweetie, you know, pet that you can trust your infants with. And then more broadly than that, how much we cast the net. Obviously, dogs have been subject to some thousands of years of domestication. But if we go further back to, say, hundreds of thousands of years or millennia of years that include canines, more broadly, foxes and wolves and then domesticated dogs, the difference between the golden retriever and the wolf is going to be, by and large, biologically driven. And so the analogy then, to come back to human beings, to put it bluntly, Nietzsche would say some human beings are basically born golden retrievers and born Chihuahuas and born various other kinds of lap dogs and. And nice to have around the house dogs. But some human beings are basically predators. They are wolves, they are foxes. And that, that's just the way it is. And so there's a whole predetermined biopsychological array. And that's the fundamental fact about human nature, that our understanding of psychology and thereby morality, which is just a kind of a concretization or an abstraction and reification of psychological types from Nietzsche's perspective and then on to social theory. [00:47:36] Speaker B: Yeah, and that kind of goes back to my earlier question that I, I was asking during your break. So it's not that he was just concerned about you know, labor saving devices, he would be for slavery anyway, just because he thinks they're kind of a different kind of human. [00:47:54] Speaker A: Yeah, I don't know. Maybe Nietzsche commented on labor slave saving devices. But what I think it runs through against the spirit of just about everything in Nietzsche, that labor saving device might be valuable to the extent that they free up that tiny minority of individuals who otherwise might have to work for a living. So if, for example, you use the labor saving devices to actually not let yourself be distracted by housework, to actually go out into the mountains and become a mountain climber. Climber or a great adventurer of some sort, or you use the new devices to become a deep sea diver or to do something serious with arts, and he does open things up, possibly to some intellectual pursuits, to become a great scientist of some sorts, then. Yes. But my suspicion is that for Nietzsche, he's going to be initially suspicious of them, because the labor saving devices are going to lull many people into an easy life, to think that they don't have to work and that there is some value to discipline and the kinds of discipline that can be, that come from necessity, and you being forced to do things that you otherwise might not be willing to do. And I think the, the rest is going to be that, since he believes I'm just putting an arbitrary number to it, that 90% of human beings are not fit for anything significant in terms of human development anyway. If you just give them a whole bunch of labor saving devices, they're just even more going to turn into human blubber than they are are. So you're even going to be doing them a disservice. [00:50:00] Speaker B: Okay, I'd like to go back to what you were saying about, you know, there's different types of slavery. There's physical slavery, then there's almost like the slavery of the mind or being monastic. And, you know, does that exist in the same person? [00:50:22] Speaker A: Physical slavery and slavery of the mind? That's an interesting question. So if you take someone like, say, Epictetus, the great stoic philosopher, who was also actually a slave, but he was nonetheless able to not let his being a physical slave, but he wasn't doing hard physical labor. He was able to cultivate his intellectual talents, but nonetheless, to become the great philosopher that he was, he had to impose upon himself an intellectual discipline to actually study and write and think and engage in all of that hard work. So it is possible, I think Nietzsche would say, looking back, to say that there are outliers, those who are in a social slavery state, but nonetheless are the rare outlier who has something going on spiritually that enables them to do something special. At that point, I was initially thinking about if we don't think only about people in a monastic tradition, so it might have been, say, in the Middle Ages, the options available to someone who is actually bright and had some fire inside, but was living in a relatively brutal medieval, dark ages context. What could that person do, particularly if he wasn't the firstborn son or if he was not born into the aristocracy, where, say, a martial type of aristocratic calling was available to him? That person might find the spiritual discipline of going into the church attractive, and so select it not because he's necessarily particularly religious or wants to minister to the poor, but is attracted to the idea of kind of a self discipline. And how much can I deny myself in order to free myself from becoming a physical slave and a slave to my appetites and see how far I can go trying to become a purely spiritual being? And then as things broaden out, people in the arts might then start to do so. If I'm going to be a serious musician, I need to impose upon myself a kind of slavery that I'm not going to chase after women. I'm not going to drink, I'm not going to eat great food. I'm going to teach myself, to deny myself the pleasures of the body and social life and so forth, in order to dedicate myself to my calling, which is to become a great artist of some sort. And so I will impose a slavery on myself, and it'll be kind of spiritual or psychological slavery in order to do so. And it's also, I think, true biographically. If we look at many of the great military leaders who they did not chase after women, even though they had the options. They dressed simply, they ate simply. And it wasn't just that they wanted to set an example for their true. But they were also trying to impose upon themselves a single mindedness of purpose and to make themselves, so to speak, a slave to their military calling, to see how far they could take, to take that. So that's an interesting avenue to explore. [00:54:21] Speaker B: Okay, let me try this one. In the time we have left, can you differentiate kind of Nietzsche's take on slavery with Aristotle's? [00:54:36] Speaker A: Yeah, that's an interesting question. And I know Aristotle was also in favor of slavery. I think, for sure there is some overlap. Aristotle surveying people empirically the way he was, as an empirical minded people would have seen lots of adults who did not seem to have much of a spark to them. And that would include many women who were not given an education. So the conclusion that he would reach from his observation is he seems like many people don't particularly mind being slaves, and it doesn't seem like they have the aptitude for being slaves. So does it mean that you can treat them brutally, but that they belong to, so to speak, a lower order of human potential? And to the extent that they're going to add value to society, the way they're going to add value to society is by doing the kinds of things that slaves and women traditionally have. Have done. Now, if you put to him the question that some of the other Greeks did, you know, it might be unfair then to say, if you're looking at an adult slave who has not had the benefits of gymnastic training to see what he can develop physically or an education to see what he could have done intellectually, and the same thing to women, if girls had been educated differently, I don't really know what he would have said because I haven't read in Aristotle where he's taken that question up systematically. So nature, though, is then, I think, in a different social and political context, because he has over 2000 years of human history, where many people who had been in slavery had broken free from slavery or had, within the confines of slavery, nonetheless done some very significant things. And Nietzsche was in a context within which there were, in the societies that had abolished slavery already, many former slaves who had gone on to done some, to do various significant things. And there were, you know, plenty of extraordinarily accomplished women, for example, in the renaissance, in the. In the enlightenment, in the. In the 18 hundreds and so forth. So I think there's much less excuse in that respect for Nietzsche to have concluded some of the things that he did compared to Aristotle over two millennia earlier. [00:57:26] Speaker B: That's fair. In that same sense is maybe Nietzsche and some other philosophers of the day that had a more negative view of humanity, they didn't see what was going to come and, you know, our current prosperity. [00:57:43] Speaker A: Yeah, that's an interesting issue, because to some extent the invisible, the industrial revolution is almost invisible to Nietzsche. And the developments of capitalism also seem largely invisible to Nietzsche. Now, partly that is because the most industrialized nations of the time were Britain and America. And America. He does have some things to say about America, but not very much. And it's hard for a central european intellectual to take America that seriously in the middle part of the 18 hundreds. But then you might say, well, what about Britain? And european intellectuals took Britain very seriously previously, not only as an intellectual power, but as an economic powerhouse, engineering powerhouse, a political powerhouse. Why did Nietzsche not take the British more seriously? And he did, but he was not, I think, at all, particularly interested in industrial issues. And while there are some quasi scientific things that he's reflecting upon, he does not have a scientific cast of mind in that sense, that he's interested in the latest developments in microbiology and the periodic table and industrial technology like microscopes and so forth. It's just not what he is interested. He is a humanities intellectual. He likes philosophy and art, and he's a classicist. So the modern world he starts off thinking of as a great disappointment, and he's much more hearkening back to the greatness that was Greece, the greatness that was, that was Rome. And to the extent that he is aware, he is aware that Britain has been a great philosophical nation. When he reads the british philosophers and he's aware of Francis Bacon, he's aware of John Locke, he finds their, their brand of materialism, their brand of reductionism as kind of insulting to the human condition. He kind of calls it kind of a mechanical dullification. And he doesn't really see it as a, as a, as a, as a deep philosophy. He sees a it as a superficial philosophy and the utilitarians and their moral philosophy as a rather primitive, again, reductionistic understanding of human nature. He has a much more organic kind of vitalistic understanding of humanity. So the kinds of sciences that are going to attract him more are going to be kind of vitalistic, evolutionary, biological. And he sees the British as much to mechanical, materialistic, reductionistic. So he thinks that even though they have produced some influential philosophies in Bacon, Locke and so forth, they are non starters. And then to the extent that he's aware of capitalism, he doesn't say very much about capitalism, at least to my knowledge. But he thinks, again, capitalism is too much about individual freedom. He thinks it dehumanizes people, seduces them into a money making life when there are higher callings. And he thinks capitalism is also tied up too much with liberalism. So rather than just let anybody trade with just anybody, Nietzsche's not quite sure that we should let just anybody breed a with just anybody. So liberal attitudes toward sexuality and love and marriage are of a piece with capitalist attitudes toward trade, and it's just going to both lead to kind of lowest common denominator breeding and lowest common denominator production. And he's just against the whole package. [01:02:07] Speaker B: Great. Well, this has been a great discussion. Thank you so much for doing it. Thanks to everyone who joined us today. If you enjoyed this or any of our other materials, please consider making a tax deductible donation at atlas society.org, and we'll look forward to seeing you at our next event. Take care. Thanks again, Stephen. [01:02:31] Speaker A: All right, thanks a lot for organizing, Scott. See you next time.